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Oil represents a key commodity in the world energy market and it is not a surprise
that its price is largely viewed as one of the leading indicator of the global economic health.
Therefore, the recent soaring up of the price of oil has generated a large concern about its
potential e¤ects on global economic activity. Indeed, even though most developped economies
are generally better prepared to deal with oil shocks nowdays than in the 1970s (better
conduct of monetary policies, technological progress), the e¤ective role of oil price shocks
in a¤ecting macroeconomic performance is still debated. The aim of this thesis is then to
investigate some aspects of the relationship between oil and the macroeconomy by means of
both an empirical and a theoretical analysis.
In the rst chapter I perform an empirical analysis of the impact of oil price shocks on
the US economy, notably focusing on GDP and a price index. I rst present some facts
which justify the adoption of a non-standard approach in the investigation of the US oil-
macroeconomy relationship, which appears to be non-linear and tends to become weaker
over time. Indeed, I show that when the US economy is split into a traded and a non-traded
goods sector then both the GDP share and the value added share of the non-traded sector
appear to have increased over the last decades. It is then reasonable to investigate whether
this change in the composition of the US economy might have a¤ected the oil-macroeconoy
relationship, all the more when it is added that the two sectors also show di¤erent business
cycle properties, with the traded goods sector being much more volatile than the non-traded
sector, but at the same time are very similar in terms of energy intensity. The purpose of
this rst chapter is then an attempt to detect whether a composition e¤ect may contribute
to explain both the non-linearity and the weakening of the oil-macroeconomy relationship.
To this end I adopt VAR analysis as it allows me to treat the price of oil as an endogenous
variable while and provides me with a exible scheme for the identication of oil innovations.
This disaggregated analysis of the e¤ects of oil price innovations then produces interesting
results. First of all, I nd a strong evidence that the traded and the non-traded goods
sectors are very di¤erently a¤ected by oil price innovations. Indeed, both the growth rate of
GDP and the ination rate of the traded good sector tend to react much more to oil price
innovations than the corresponding variables of the non-traded good sector. Secondly, the
analysis of the non-linearity of the oil-macroeconomy relationship at the sectorial level reveals
a di¤erent behaviour across sectors too. Indeed, while traded goods sector variables appear
to be much more sensitive to positive than to negative oil price innovations, this is not much
evident for non-traded goods sector variables. Thirdly, I show that the oil-macroeconomy
relationship appears to be more stable at the sectorial level than at the aggregate level,
and I conclude that data do not reject the possibility that the observed weakening of the
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oil-macroeconomy relationship at the aggregate level might be partially explained by the
change in the sectoral composition of the US economy.
In the second paper I move to a theoretical investigation of the link between structural
change in the sectoral composition of the economy and the decreasing impact of oil price
shocks on economic activity. Indeed, this approach has never followed by previous investi-
gation which has explained the weakening of the oil-macroeconomyrelationship, which has
been usually explained either emphasizing the role of monetary policies, or that of more e¢ -
cient technologies, or, nally, as a consequence of the "great moderation, as it is commonly
labelled the global trend of large reduction in business cycle volatility. Two empirical pieces
of evidence motivate a theoretical analysis of this composition e¤ect. Firstly, the increase
of the GDP share of the non-traded good sector at the expense of that of the traded good
sector over the last decades. Secondly, the fact that the non-traded goods sector is less
sensitive to the e¤ects of oil shocks than the traded good sector. The analysis is then based
on a two-country, two-sector model, with traded and non-traded intermediate goods which
are produced with oil, labor and sector-specic capital. The model is able to reproduces the
larger impact of oil price shocks on the traded good sector through consumption smoothing.
In particular, for this result to hold I assume that the investment good is composed only
of traded goods, while the consumption good is composed of both traded and non-traded
goods. I then use the model to perform an experiment through which I can analyse if an
increase of the GDP share of the non traded good sector can change the way oil shocks
a¤ect the economic activity. In order to reproduce this structural change I then refer to the
two main mechanisms that the literature puts forward: the utility-basedand the unbal-
ances productivity growth(UPG) mechanism. The rst mechanism is based on the idea
that the increase of the GDP share of the non-traded good sector is induced by households
preferences. The second mechanism, instead, relies on di¤erent growth rates of total factor
productivities (TFP) across sectors, which in turn induce an increase of the GDP share of
the slowest-growing sector. To perform the experiment that is based on the UPG mechanism
I have nonetheless to perform a preliminary analysis. First, I have to determine what are
the specic demand conditions that the model must satisfy for the UPG mechanism to work
properly. Second, I have to get an understanding of how the oil-macroeconomy relationship
in the model is directly a¤ected by increasing the TFPs. In order to nd an analytical an-
swer to these two problems I set-up a basic model which allows for a closed form solution.
I then show that the only demand condition which must be satised is that the elasticity
of substitution between traded and non-traded goods be su¢ ciently small, namely below
unity. Furthermore, I nd that in an international framework it is a su¢ cient condition that
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a UPG mechanism be at work abroad for a country to experience a structural change in the
sectoral composition of its economy. I then show that with a Cobb Douglas technology the
oil price elasticity of GDP is not a¤ected by changes in total factor productivities. Once I
am provided with these pieces of information, I can then perform the experiment using both
mechanisms. I then nd that, whatever is the mechanism which causes the structural change
in the economy, the increase of the GDP share of the non traded good sector weakens the
e¤ects of oil shocks on economic activity, even though only marginally, and I argue that this
e¤ect is mainly caused by the fact that the structural change reduces the size of international
spillovers.
In the third paper I pass to examine a third debated aspect of the oil-macroeconomy
relationship, that is the fact that oil shocks appear to have a large e¤ect on economic
activity, where by largeI mean an oil price elasticity of GDP greater than the oil share.
Indeed, as the GDP share of oil costs in the economy is usually small, being on average around
3-4% for OECD countries, the reported estimation of the impact of the oil price shocks in
the 1970s is far larger than the mere GDP share of oil costs. Thus, this raises the question on
what mechanism is at work in amplifying the e¤ect of oil shocks on economic activity. This
paper then analyses the impact of oil price shocks on GDP in an open economy framework
and develops a mechanism which is able to amplify them beyond the oil share. For these
purposes, I set up two theoretical models. I rst set up a basic two-country model whose
analytical tractability allows me to obtain the following results on the oil-macroeconomy
relationship in an open economy framework. First, I show that the introduction of nominal
rigidities considerably modies the way oil shocks a¤ect the economy with respect to the
exible price regime. In the exible price regime the e¤ect of oil shocks on economic activity is
symmetric across countries and the oil price elasticity of both GDP and price level is constant.
Instead, with the introduction of nominal rigidities oil shocks turn to have asymmetric e¤ects
across countries, and the oil price elasticity of both GDP and price becomes an increasing
function of the size of oil shocks. Second, I show analytically that a small open economy
model, in comparison to a general equilibrium model, underestimates the e¤ect of oil price
shocks on GDP. Third, I show that the use of either the nominal or the real price of oil
has di¤erent implications as to the impact of oil shocks on the economy, even though both
measures lead to similar results as long as the oil share is small. The basic model has a
limited explaining power for the largee¤ect of oil shocks on GDP. I then show that in an
extended two-country, two-sector model with sector specic capital, oil price shocks can
cause a largee¤ect on GDP even with exible prices. Di¤erently from former multi-sector
models that have been developed to analyse the oil-macroeconomyrelationship, I do not
xassume di¤erent technologies across sector, namely I assume that the two sectors have the
same oil intensity. Indeed, the model may produce largee¤ects of oil price shocks on GDP
even with an identical technology across sectors as long as consumption and investment have
a di¤erent composition in terms of sectorial intermediate goods. The introduction of nominal
wage rigidities then further amplies the e¤ects of oil price shocks on GDP with respect to
the exible price regime. In particular, oil shocks do not only cause a larger impact on GDP
but also their e¤ect on economic activity become more persistent.
Part II
Chapters
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CHAPTER 1
CAN A DISAGGREGATE ANALYSIS EXPLAIN THE
EFFECTS OF OIL PRICE INNOVATIONS ON THE US
ECONOMY?
1.1 Introduction
The empirical oil literature highlights that the e¤ects of oil innovations on the aggregate
economic activity, notably GDP and the price level, are non-linear and tend to become
weaker over time. 1
The decreasing impact of oil innovations on economic activity has then been explained
in many ways: the consequence of mismeasurements and mispecications in the empirical
analysis, the e¤ect of technological progress, a lower degree of real wage rigidities and the
by-product of the so-called great moderation, that is the ongoing global trend of a lowering
output and ination volatility.2 3
The non-linearity of the oil-macroeconomyrelationship has instead been explained ei-
ther assuming reallocation costs in multi-sector models, or via the asymmetry of monetary
policy or by highlighting the e¤ect of oil innovations on the level of uncertainty in the econ-
omy.
To investigate these aspects of the oil-macroeconomyrelationship I move away from
the standard approach, which takes GDP and the price level at the aggregate level. In fact,
I argue that this approach is valid as long as at least one of the two following conditions is
fullled. First, di¤erent sectors of the economy must react similarly to oil price innovations.
Second, the GDP share of any sector in the economy must remain constant over time.
1The non-linearity or asymmetry of the oil-macroeconomyrelationship refers to the evidence that during
periods of large oil price fall the economic activity did not boost by the same amount it has been disrupted
in periods of large oil price increases.
2Evidence in favor of a structural change in most time series of the US economy is reported by Blanchard
and Simon (2000), McConnell and Perez Quiroz (2001), Sargent and Cogley (2001) and Stock and Watson
(2003).
3The intense research on the reasons of the Great Moderation has then produced a number of di¤erent
explanations which include, among others, changes in monetary policy (Clarida et al 2000, Cogley and
Sargent 2003, Boivin and Giannoni 2002 and Lubik and Schorfheide 2004). the change in the way technology
shocks are transmitted to the economy (Galì 1999, Christiano Eichenbaum and Vigfusson 2003, Uhlig 2004,
Dedola and Neri 2004, Francis and Ramey 2005), the change in the way scal policy is conducted and the
deepening of global nancial markets.
1
1.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 2
I show that in the US both conditions are not respected when the economy is split into
a traded and a non-traded goods sectors. Indeed, it is evident that over the last decades the
US GDP share of the non-traded goods sector has constantly increased at the expense of that
of the traded goods sector. Second, I also show that the price and the output of the traded
goods sector have cyclical components which are much more volatile than the corresponding
ones of the non-traded goods sector. Finally, my analysis also di¤er from former disaggregate
analysis of the e¤ects of oil price shocks as it does not focus on di¤erences across sectors in
energy intensity. In particular, I also show that the traded and the non-traded goods sectors
are not much di¤erent in terms of energy intensity.
I then use VAR analysis to address three questions on the e¤ects of oil price innovations
on a disaggregated economy. First, I ask whether oil innovations a¤ect similarly the price
and the output of the two sectors. Second, I check whether positive and negative oil price
innovations have a symmetric e¤ect on sectorial outputs and prices. Finally, I ask whether
the oil-macroeconomyrelationship is more stable at the sectorial level than at the aggregate
level.
My results are as follows. First, the size of the response to oil price innovations of the
price and the output of the traded goods sector is much larger than those of the corresponding
variables of the non traded good sector. Second, I show that data strongly reject a linear
oil-macroeconomyrelationship at the sectorial only for the traded goods sector.4 Third, I
show that data do nt reject the possibility that the oil-macroeconomyrelationship is more
stable at the sectorial rather than at the aggregate level.
I conclude that it is not possible to reject the possibility that the observed weakening
in the US of the oil-macroeconomy relationship at the aggregate level might be partially
explained by the change in the sectoral composition that has the US has experienced over the
last decades. Moreover, I argue that the observed non-linear oil-macroeconomy relationship
at the aggregate level is principally caused by the behavior of the traded goods sector.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briey reviews the relevant literature. Sec-
tion 3 reports a preliminary analysis which supports the choice of the disaggregate analysis.
Section 4 presents the VAR analysis and provides results. Section 5 concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
Empirical studies on the inverse relationshipbetween oil and economic ac-
tivity at the aggregate and disaggregate level.
4At the aggregate level, non-linear e¤ects of oil price shocks to the economy are a well-established result.
Cfr. Mork (1989), Loungani (1986) and Davis(1987).
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Hamilton (1983) was the rst to observe that in the period 1945-1973 almost any US
recession was preceded by a sharp increase in the price of oil, and that these recessions could
not be explained through other variables. Since then, empirical analysis has conrmed the
presence of an inverse-relationshipbetween oil and the economic activity at the aggregate
level. 5
At the disaggregate level, a negative relation between oil price and industrial performance
is reported by Keane and Prasad (1996), Davis et al. (1996), Davis and Haltiwanger (2001),
Lee and Ni (2002) and Bohi(1989, 1991). The main focus of these works is on the link
between the energy intensity of an industry and its sensitivity to oil innovations, but their
conclusions are not concordant. Bohi (1991) does not nd a clear link between the energy
intensity of an industry and its output decline after an oil shock. Hamilton argues that
this result by Bohi is due to the fact that he does not take into account the costs of input
reallocation which are induced by oil price innovations and are independent of the industry
specic energy intensity. Lee and Ni (2002), instead, nd evidence that positive oil price
shocks reduce the output of energy-intensive industries but also that the demand in other
industries gets reduced. Davis and Haltiwanger (2001) nd some evidence on positive oil
price shocks reducing employment the most in industries that are more capital intensive.
Finally, Keane and Prasad (1996) analyze the e¤ect of oil price shocks on wages across
industries and nd that this e¤ect is very diversied.
The weakening of the oil-macroeconomy relationship
The evidence of a weakening of the oil-macroeconomic relationship over the last 20 years
has been highlighted by Hooker (1996,1999), Hamilton (1996), Loungani and Yücel (2000),
and Blanchard and Galì (2007).6
Many theoretical explanations of the phenomenon have then been put forward. A rst
argument, referred to here as the oil-intensity argument, is based on gain in technology
e¢ ciency (Brown and Yücel 1995, Pomarantz and Robber 2005, Blanchard and Galì 2007):
over time, a more e¢ cient use of energy resources and the adoption of new technologies have
both reduced the oil share required for a unit of output. Pomarantz and Robber (2005)
provide evidence that the oil intensity, that is dened as the quantity of oil per unit of
output, has declined in all G-7 countries, with the US, for example, requiring a quarter less
5Early empirical studies include Pierce and Enzler (1974), Rasche and Tatom (1977), Mork and Hall
(1980), Gisser and Goodwin (1986), Darby (1982), Burbidge and Harrison (1984) and Bruno and Sachs
(1981, 1985) Later studies comprend Woodford and Rotemberg (1996), Raymond and Rich(1997), Carruth
et al. (1998).
6In particular, the debate on the robustness of the oil-macroeconomyrelationship between Hooker (1996)
and Hamilton (1996) has been crucial to put in evidence how the oil price stopped to have a strong predictive
power for GDP growth after 1985.
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of oil per unit of output in 2003 than it did in the early1980s. However, the real e¤ectiveness
of the oil-intensity argument is still debated.
Loungani and Yücel (2000) and Brown (2000) argue that the oil shocks in the 1990s were
not so disruptive, in comparison to those in the1970s, because their e¤ect has been muted
by the contemporaneous occurrence of other factors, namely a strong global productivity
growth.
Some authors attribute the weakening of the oil-macroeconomy relationship to a more
e¤ective monetary policy. They argue that after the dramatic experience of the 70s and 80s,
monetary policy began to react better to oil price innovations. Hooker (1999), for example,
argues that when Volcker took over the chair of the Federal Reserve the monetary policy
become less accommodating to oil price innovations than in the past and no longer triggered
expectations of higher ination.
Hooker (1996) and Lee et al. (1995) investigate the role of statistical mismeasurement as
a possible cause of the breakdown in the oil-macroeconomic relationship. Hooker considers as
possible sources of mismeasurement the uneven distribution of oil price innovations over the
sample period, the change in the statistical properties of the price of oil after 1973, and the
occurrence of structural innovations in many US macro series. However, even taking all these
sources of mismeasurement into account, he is not able to rea¢ rm the statistical signicance
of the oil-macroeconomy relationship. Lee et al., instead, argue that the it was the increase
in the oil price volatility of the mid 1980s to cause of the breakdown in the oil-macroeconomy
relationship. They then build up an oil price measure that takes into account the oil price
volatility and are able to re-establish a statistically signicant relationship between oil and
macroeconomic variables.
Rogo¤ (2006) considers that the weakening of the oil-macroeconomy relationship might
also be a consequence of the "Great Moderation", that is the constant decline in global
output volatility which since 1985 has characterized much of the world, and whose causes
can be found in the increased exibility of labor markets, in a better monetary policy and
in deeper nancial markets.
Finally, Blanchard and Galì (2007) show with a neokeynesian model that the reduction
in the real wage rigidity, a better monetary policy and technological progress are all key
factors to explain the smaller impact of oil shocks in the recent period.
The asymmetric e¤ect of oil price innovations on economic activity
In the mid-1980s the price of oil fell dramatically, but the global economic activity did
not appear to boost in the same it had been depressed by oil price increases in the 1970s.
Thus, the empirical literature started to reject a linear relationship between oil prices and real
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activity, arguing that the loss of statistical signicance of the oil-macroeconomyrelationship
might be due to the fact that only positive oil price innovations a¤ect the macroeconomic
performance.
The idea of an asymmetric e¤ectof oil price innovations, that is that positive oil price
innovations a¤ect economic activity more largely than negative ones, has found support in
Mork (1989) and Olsen and Mysen (1994). Some authors have then suggested the use of
non-linear transformations of the price of oil to reestablish the statistical signicance of the
oil-macroeconomy relationship (Mork 1989, Lee et al. 1996, Hamilton 1996).
The main theoretical arguments that have been proposed to explain the asymmetric
e¤ect of the price of oil either highlight the role of monetary policy, or that of uncertainty,
or, nally, that of sectoral shifts.
According to the monetary policy argument, the asymmetric e¤ect of the price of oil is a
consequence of an asymmetric monetary policy which tights when the price of oil increases,
but does not expand when it decreases.
The uncertainty argument states that any oil price innovation, whether positive or neg-
ative, by increasing the degree of uncertainty within the economy reduces the demand for
investment and durable goods. Thus, as oil price innovations increase uncertainty in the
economy, they always have a recessive e¤ects; the asymmetry arises because the recessive
e¤ect is either reinforced by positive oil price innovations or mitigated by negative ones.
Finally, the sectoral shift argument explains the asymmetric e¤ect of oil price innovations
by reallocation costs, as after an oil price innovations inputs have to be reallocated from
high oil-intensive to low oil-intensive sectors. These reallocation costs reinforce the recessive
e¤ect of positive oil price innovations and reduce the expansionary e¤ects of negative oil
price innovations.
The identication of oil innovations.
Oil innovations are usually identied through oil-price measures. Hamilton (1983) rstly
considered the nominal price of oil as exogenous with respect to other macroeconomic vari-
ables. However, Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) showed that the exogeneity of the nominal
price of oil can be accepted only until 1973, as the emergence of the OPEC caused a struc-
tural change in the oil market regime which made the price of oil endogenous. The use of the
price of oil to identify oil innovations has then started to be related to exogenous political
events.
Barnsky and Kilian (2004) and Kilian (2006) raise doubts about the presence and
strength of a link between political events and oil price. In this respect, Hamilton (2003)
and Kilian (2006) have proposed the use of oil-production measures as alternative variables
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to identify oil innovations. They argue that not every oil supply innovation turns out to be
associated with an oil price increase, and, at the same time, not any oil price increase occurs
because of innovations in the industrial demand (Kilian 2006). However, the limit of this
approach is that it focuses only on oil supply innovations.
Kilian (2007) has recently proposed a new identication procedure which distinguishes
among di¤erent causes of oil price innovations; he argues that the e¤ects of oil price innova-
tions on economic activity are really dependent on the cause of the innovation itself.
Finally, I refer to that part of the VAR monetary policy literature which adopts a re-
cursive approach and oil price measures to identify monetary policy innovations (Bernanke,
Gertler and Watson 1997, Bernanke and Mihov 1995, Bernanke and Blinder 1992, Hamilton
and Herrera 2004).
1.3 Preliminary analysis
In what follows I rst dene the criterion I use to choose the two sectors I decompose
the economy into, I then show that the economic share of the two sectors has drastically
changed over time, verify that the two sectors have di¤erent cyclical behavior and nally
check for di¤erences in the energy intensity between sectors.
1.3.1 Data
I disaggregate the US economy into a traded and a non-traded goods sector. For this
preliminary analysis I use the annual BEA dataset "Gross-Domestic-Product-by-Industry
Accounts, 1947-2006", which provides annual data on nominal value added and prices on
an industry-by-industry base.7 The use of nominal value added then allows me to disregard
the possibility that di¤erences across sectors be due to di¤erences in the use of intermediate
inputs.
In order to set up sectorial measures for value added and prices I have to dene any in-
dustry as either tradeable or non-tradeable, a question which is debated in empirical works.
What is standard is to identify goods producing industries as tradeables and services produc-
ing industries as non-tradeables. However, literature presents di¤erent approaches to dene
an industry as either tradeable or not. For example, De Gregorio et al. (1993) dene an
industry as tradeable if the ratio of the value of total exports to the value of total production
is above 10%.8
7Data are netted out of the public sector component.
8According to this criterion, the sector of transportation, which is classied as a services producing
industry, is considered a tradeble industry. However, this criteria set anyway an arbitrary threshold for the
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I decide to adopt the standard criterion, which while may lead be considered a rough
approximation, it is nonetheless easy to apply also to di¤erent datasets. Thus, to classify an
industry as either tradeable or non-tradeable I turn to the distinction between goods pro-
ducing and services producing industries. The non tradeable sector is then composed of the
following industries (with their average relative weight in parenthesis): Utilities (3,5%); Con-
struction (8,7%); Wholesale trade (9,5%); Retail sale(12%); Transportation and warehousing
(7,6%); Finance insurance, real estate, rental and leasing (27,2%); Professional and business
services (12,9%); Educational services, health care, and social assistance (8,6%); Arts, en-
tertainment, recreation, accommodation and food services (5,3%); Other services except
government (4,7%). The tradeable sector, instead, consists of the following sectors (with
their average relative share in parenthesis): Manufacturing (71,5%); Agriculture, forestry,
shing and Hunting (10,4%); Mining (5,7%); information (12,4%).
1.3.2 The pattern of the economic share of the non traded good sector
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75 The GDP share of the non-traded goods sectorThe value added share of the non-traded goods sector
Figure 1.1 - The pattern of the US GDP and added value share of the non-traded goods
sector, 1947-2005
Figure 1.1 reports the share of US value added represented by the non-traded goods
denition of an industry as either tradeable or not, and at the same might be misleading. For example, it is
possible that a tradeable industry with a domestic production insu¢ cient to the internal demand to register
a value of the ratio of exports over production below 10% and so being classied as non-tradeable.
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sector over the period 1947-2004. It is evident that it has steadily increased over the years:
in 1947 it was less than 53% of the aggregate value added, but by 2004 it was around 76%.
In the same gure I also report the pattern of the GDP share of the non-traded goods sector,
which also shows a clear upward trend.9
The clear change in the composition of the US aggregate economy then raises the question
whether the two sectors have di¤erent cyclical components as to sectorial price and output,
as if it is the case then a disaggregated analysis of the oil-macroeconomyrelationship based
on such a decomposition would be justied.
1.3.3 Cyclical Fluctuations in the traded and the non-traded goods sector
I now consider the business cycle components of the time series of the price and the
nominal value added for the two sectors. I also consider the markup to get an insight on
the role of marginal costs in driving prices. In fact, according to which between marginal
cost or markup drives the price uctutation, I can indirectly evaluate the strength of the
energy intensity argument. Indeed, the latter explains the propagation of oil innovations to
the economy principally through their e¤ects on marginal costs. I then estimate the time
series of the markups for the two sectors using the procedure by Woodford and Rotemberg
(1995).
I obtain the cyclical and the trend component of the time series by applying the Hodrick-
Prescott lter. I then divide the cyclical component of each time series by its corresponding
trend component to be able to make a comparison across sectors.
9The GDP share of the non-traded goods sector is computed using disaggregate data on GDP and Price
indexes by NIPA (table 1.5.4."Price Indexes for Gross Domestic" and Table 1.5.5"Gross Domestic Product,
Expanded Detail"). The nominal GDP of the traded goods sector is obtained by aggregating the following
entries: personal consumption expenditures on Durable goods (Motor vehicles and parts; Furniture and
household equipment; Other) and Nondurable goods ( Food, Clothing and shoes, Other durable goods);
Gross private domestic investment in Nonresidential Fixed Investment (Information processing equipment
and software; Industrial equipment; Transportation equipment; Other equipment), Change in private in-
ventories. The nominal GDP of the non-traded sectors is computed by aggregating the following entries:
Personal consumption expenditures on Services (Housing; Electricity and gas; Other household operations;
Transportation; Medical care; Recreation ; Other), the Gross private domestic investment in Residential
xed Investment, the Gross private domestic investment in Nonresidential xed Investment (infrastructure).
The time series of GDP price deator for the two sectors are constructed using a weighted average of the
sectorial entries, each weighted by its relative GDP share within the sector.
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Figure 1.2 - The uctuations of Price and Value Added in the traded and non-traded goods
sectors
Figure 1.2 shows the cyclical component of the value added (bottom panel) and the price
(top panel) of the two sectors. The cyclical components of both variables appear to comove
positively across sectors and, most importantly, both the price and the value added of the
traded good sector are more volatile than the the price and the value added of the non-traded
sector.
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Figure 1.3 - Price and markup uctuations in the traded and non-traded goods sectors
Figure 1.3 compares the uctuations of the price and the markup of the non-traded (top
panel) and traded goods sectors (bottom panel). In both sectors the markup uctuates more
than the price at almost any period. As the latter may be driven either by the marginal cost
or by the markup, it is crucial to check for the sign of both the price and markup uctuation
at every period: if they have the same sign, then is the markup to drive the price, the
opposite otherwise.
In both sectors it appears as if the price and the markup have opposite signs before
the 70s , and the opposite thereafter. This impression is conrmed by the data: the price
and the markup of the traded good sector have the same sign for 22 out of 34 years in the
1970-2003 period, while only for 6 out of 23 years in the preceding period. Similarly, in the
non-traded good sector the price and the markup have the same sign for 25 out of 34 years
in the 1970-2003 period, but only for 7 out of 26 years in the preceding period.
I then argue that the lower volatility of the non-traded sector, together with the fact
that its share of the economy has constantly increased over time, justies a disaggregated
analysis of the oil-macroeconomy relationship.
1.3.4 Energy intensity
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 average
All industries 2,00% 1,70% 1,70% 2,00% 2,00% 1,90% 1,90% 2,00% 1,90%
Traded good industries* 1,75% 1,60% 1,60% 1,70% 1,80% 1,60% 1,70% 1,80% 1,7%
non-traded good industries** 1,90% 1,60% 1,60% 1,90% 1,80% 1,80% 1,80% 1,90% 1,8%
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 average
All industries 3,6% 3,1% 3,1% 3,7% 3,6% 3,4% 3,4% 3,6% 3,46%
Traded good industries* 4,68% 4,20% 4,23% 4,47% 4,69% 4,09% 4,33% 4,72% 4,4%
non-traded good industries** 3,02% 2,57% 2,58% 3,15% 2,92% 2,90% 2,91% 3,08% 2,9%
*Consists of agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting; mining except oil and gas extraction; and manufacturing except petroleum and coal products;computer and
  electronic products; publishing industries (includes software); information and data processing services; and computer systems design and related services.
**Consists of utilities,construction; wholesale trade; retail trade; transportation and warehousing; information; finance, insurance, real estate, rental, and leasing,
 arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation,professional and business services, educational services,health care, social assistance, food service,
other services except government.
Source: BEA.
Share of Gross Output - (1997-2004)
Share of Value Added - (1997-2004)
Table 1.1 - Energy intensity measures in the traded and non-traded goods sectors
Table 1 reports two measures of the energy intensity for the two sectors over the period
1997-2004.10 The rst energy intensity measure is the energy share per unit of sectorial
10Data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, and for each industry it is reported the share of GDP
represented by value added, Compensation of employees, Taxes on production and imports less subsidies,
Gross Operating Surplus and Intermediate inputs. The category of Intermediate inputs is further decomposed
into Energy inputs, Material inputs and Purchased-services inputs.
1.4. VAR ANALYSIS 11
gross output, while the second is the energy share per unit of value added. The rst energy
measure is small in size and almost equal across sectors: it is, on average, 1.7% for the traded
good sector, and 1.78% for the non-traded sector sector. Instead, when I consider the second
energy measure, I nd that the tradeable sector, whose energy measure is 4.4%, is 1.5 times
more energy intensive than the non-tradeable sector (2.9%).
It follows that di¤erent energy intensities between sectors cannot be used to explain a
di¤erent response to oil innovations when GDP data are used. However, when value added
data are used the energy intensity argument may explain a larger response to oil innovations
of the tradeable sector up to 1.5 times than that of the non-tradeable sector
1.4 VAR Analysis
1.4.1 Data
I use quarterly data over the period 1960Q2-2005Q4. I use NIPA disaggregate data on
GDP and Price indexes to construct GDP and price indexes for the traded and the non
traded goods sectors. 11
The advantages from using this dataset for the VAR analysis, with respect to that used in
the preliminary analysis, are two, and notably the higher data frequency and the exploitation
of the result that GDP data imply almost identical energy intensity across sectors.
The traded good sector GDP is obtained by aggregating the following entries: personal
consumption expenditures on Durable goods (Motor vehicles and parts; Furniture and house-
hold equipment; Other) and Nondurable goods ( Food, Clothing and shoes, Other durable
goods); Gross private domestic investment in Nonresidential Fixed Investment (Information
processing equipment and software; Industrial equipment; Transportation equipment; Other
equipment), Change in private inventories.
The non-traded sector GDP is computed by aggregating the following entries: Personal
consumption expenditures on Services (Housing; Electricity and gas; Other household op-
erations; Transportation; Medical care; Recreation ; Other), the Gross private domestic
investment in Residential xed Investment, the Gross private domestic investment in Non-
residential xed Investment (infrastructure). The time series of the price indexes for the two
sectors are constructed using a weighted average of the sectorial entries, each weighted by
its relative GDP share within the sector.12
Finally, Datastream provides the time series of the spot price of crude Brent oil or
11NIPA table 1.5.4."Price Indexes for Gross Domestic Product, Expanded Detail" and Table 1.5.5 "Gross
Domestic Product, Expanded Detail", downloadable from http://www.bea.gov/beahome.html .
12GDP and prices for the two sectors are netted out of the government and energy component
1.4. VAR ANALYSIS 12
nominal oil price (US$/barrel) and the IFS dataset the time series of the Federal Fund rate.
1.4.1.1 The choice of the oil price measure
The rst and more natural measure of the price of oil is the di¤erence of the logs of the
nominal price of oil. However, this measure has been considered unsatisfactory given the
instability and asymmetry of the oil-macroeconomy relation detected at the aggregate level.
Alternative measures have therefore been proposed by Mork (1989), Hamilton (1996) and
Lee et al. (1996)13
In my research I consider three oil price measures: the di¤erence of the logs of the
nominal price of oil (Brent measure), a version of the oil price measure by Mork (Mork
measure) and a version of the net oil price measure by Hamilton (Hamilton measure). In
my analysis the Mork measure is dened by the di¤erence of the logs of the nominal price of
oil with zero replacing negative values. The Hamilton measure is dened by the percentage
change by which the nominal price of oil at quarter t exceeds the peak value in the previous
year, with zero replacing negative values
I decide to focus on nominal measures of the price of oil as the use of nominal price
measures has the advantage of not incorporating ination innovations.
1.4.2 The identication of oil innovations: a recursive approach
The oil-macroeconomy relationship is not clear in its causes and e¤ects. Thus, the iden-
tication of oil innovations is often related to exogenous political events. However, the same
possibility of using exogenous events has been challenged by Barsky and Kilian:
even major OPEC oil price increases in the 1970s would have been far less
likely in the absence of conducive macroeconomic conditions resulting in excess
demand in the oil market. (Barsky and Kilian 2004, p 2 )
I then decide to perform a VAR analysis as this permits me both to consider the price of
oil as an endogenous variable and to adopt a recursive approach to identify oil innovations.
The use of a recursive approach, while has the advantage of being an extremely exible
identication scheme, brings also a cost, which is the degree of arbitrariness that is introduced
through those economic beliefs which are required for the identication.
13Hamilton (2003) tests for most measures of the price of oil to determine which one best represents the
non-linear oil-macroeconomy relationship, and concludes in favor of the net oil measure (Hamilton 1996)
together with second-moment based measures (Lee et al. 1996).
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To understand in details how the recursive approach may be used to identify oil innova-
tions let us consider a general representation of a structural VAR:
B0Xt = B1(L)Xt 1 + "t;
whereXt denotes the vector of endogenous variables, "t the vector of orthogonal innovations and
B0; B1(L) are, respectively, a square matrix and a matrix in the lag operator of parameters.
In empirical analysis it is generally estimated the reduced form of the VAR:
Xt = A1(L)Xt 1 + Ut
A0 = (B0)
 1 ; A1(L) = A0B1(L) ; Ut = A0"t:
The problem of identication consists in identifying the vector of innovations ("t) using
the reduced form residuals (Ut) : As Ut can be represented as a linear combination of "t the
problem of identication amounts to estimating the matrix A0.
Let us denote by xt an element of Yt and by xt_ the set of elements of Xt other than xt.
It is possible to write a generic equation of the system Ut = A0"t in the following form:
uxt = "
x
t + "
x_
t :
At any period t; the reduced form residual of the generic variable xt, uxt ; is determined
by two components: its own innovation or structural error, "xt , and a linear combination of
innovations of the other variables,  "x_t : The intuitive interpretation of this second term is
the automatic or systematic response of the variable xt to contemporaneous innovations in
the other variables.
Economic beliefs on the transmission mechanism of innovations might allow us to write
the matrix A0 in a triangular form so that it would be possible to identify recursively inno-
vations via an equation-by-equation OLS estimation.14
14To better clarify this last point lets consider a generic matrix A0 :
A0 =
0@ A011 A012 A013 A014A021 A022 A023 A024
A031 A032 A033 A034
A041 A042 A043 A044
1A :
A recursive structure on A0 requires it to be triangular. This feature implies that the ordering of the
variables becomes crucial. In fact, the ordering has a direct e¤ect on the structure of the contemporaneous
innovations: the variable set rst is assumed not to be contemporaneously a¤ected by other variable innova-
tions. In practice, this assumption implies that in the above matrix A0; A012; A013; A014 = 0 and A011 = 1.
The variable set in second position is then a¤ected by its own innovation and by the innovation in the vari-
able set in the rst position. Again, this means that A023; A024 = 0; A022 = 1 and A021 6= 0. A similar
reasoning applies to all other variables so that A0 results triangular.
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However, economic beliefs are not necessary when the information that are contained
in the price of oil are orthogonal to those contained in the other variables. In this respect,
Kilian (2007) nds that oil price reduced form innovations are nearly all due to oil specic
demand shocks.15 Thus, to verify whether oil innovations are indeed orthogonal to all the
other innovations I follow a rough strategyin which I consider any possible ordering of the
variables (apart from the Fed Funds rate) and impose to each a recursive structure that is
independent on any economic beliefs. If the IRFs that I obtain from every variable ordering
do not di¤er substantially I can interpret it as a signal that the information contained in the
oil price is nearly orthogonal to that contained in the other variables.
1.4.2.1 Economic beliefs on monetary policy innovations
I interpret innovations in the Federal Fund rate as monetary policy innovations.1617 I
then refer to the VAR monetary policy literature to get insights into how monetary policy
innovations a¤ect the economy. As monetary policy is committed to macroeconomic sta-
bility, it is commonly argued that changes in the Federal Funds rate are at least partially
endogenous.18 This is often the reason why monetary policy variables are usually set after
In general, being k the number of endogenous variables, in order to identify oil innovations I need some
identifying assumptions whose number depend on the variable ordering. Without loss of generality, lets set
the oil price as the k1 + 1 variable, then A0 will look like:
A0
(kxk)
=
0BBBB@
A1;10
(k1xk1)
A1;20
(k1x1)
A1;30
(k1x(k k1 1))
A2;10
(1xk1)
A2;20
(1x1)
A2;30
(1x(k k1 1))
A3;10
((k k1 1)xk1)
A3;20
((k k1 1)x1)
A3;30
((k k1 1)x(k k1 1))
1CCCCA :
As I am interested in identifying oil price innovations, I only need to estimate the k1 + 1 column of A0.
I rst notice that it is possible to assume A1;10 triangular without loss of generality, as long as we do not
need to identify innovations of the rst k1 variables. Moreover, to identify oil price innovations I do not need
any assumption on the parameters of A0 relative to variables set after the oil price measure. Thus, I need
(k1x (k   k1   1)) + k   1 identifying assumptions.
15Oil innovations, as classied by Kilian (2006), may be due to supply shocks driven by political events,
other supply shocks, shocks to the aggregate demand for industrial commodities and demand shocks that
are specic to the crude oil market (usually shifts driven by higher precautionary demand associated with
fears about future oil supplies).
16A problem in using the Federal Funds rate is that, in general, it is not possible to test whether innovations
in the federal funds rate are dominated by demand-side or supply-side forces. However, many authors o¤er
evidence in support of the view that innovations in the Federal Fund Rate are mostly attributable to the
Federal Reserves policy decisions (Bernanke and Blinder 1992).
17As stressed by Eichenbaum (1992), there is no a well-established methodology to compare across alterna-
tives measures of the monetary policy stance. Therefore, the literature presents di¤erent proposals: Federal
Funds Rate (Bernanke and Blinder 1992, Laurent 1988, Bernanke 1990, Christiano and Eichenbaum 1996);
short-term rates (Sims 1992); non-borrowed reserves (Christiano and Eichenbaum 1992, 1996); proportion
of non-borrowed reserves growth rate orthogonal to total reserves growth (Strongin 1995); borrowed reserves
(Cosimano and Sheehan 1995).
18A further problem related to policy innovations, pointed out by Cochrane (1996), is that in the evaluation
of the e¤ects of policy innovations on the economy it is not possible to distinguish between the part of the
change in the economy due to the innovation per se and the part of the change due to the change in policy
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non-policy variables in the variable ordering of VARs. I then follow the literature in assuming
that monetary policy innovations do not have any systematic e¤ect on non-policy variables.
Moreover, I also assume that monetary policy innovations have no contemporaneous e¤ect
on the price of oil. Indeed, monetary innovations would a¤ect the oil market only indirectly,
through their e¤ects on US aggregate demand, which in turn a¤ects the global demand of
oil. As it is usually estimated that monetary policy innovations are not quantitatively im-
portant and take more than a quarter to produce a peak reaction to GDP and ination (i.e.
Christiano and Eichenbaum 1996) I consider this evidence as supportive of my assumption.
I then set the Fed Fund rate always as last in the variable ordering of the VAR.19
1.4.2.2 Reasons for oil innovations being orthogonal to other innovations
As a result of the rough strategy it turns out that results are independent of the specic
variable ordering that is assumed, and so of the implied economic beliefs and structural
restrictions. Thus, even though I adopt a recursive model it is not strictly necessary to
justify the analysis on the basis of a specic structural restriction, as anyone else would lead
to the the same results. It is then possible to investigate a possible explanation of why oil
innovations are orthogonal to innovations of the other variables. I argue that this result
relies on the characteristics of the pricing system of the oil market. Indeed, crude oil is a
commodity that cannot be immediately incorporated into nal consumption goods: it has
rst to be transformed by reneries into oil products, which are in turn used in nal good
productions. Accordingly, a change in the price of oil requires some time to propagate into
the economy.
Historically, until 1979 the oil pricing system was dominated by long-term contracts and
the spot price of oil had a marginal role in the oil market. After 1979, with the end of the
OPEC era, the importance of the spot price of oil has increased up to the point it become
the reference price in the so-called spot price continuum (table 1.2), that is the set of possible
prices used in the oil market.20 Any price in the spot price continuum refers to a specic
contract with its own characteristic in terms of price determination and of the temporal lag,
that is the span of time which passes between the date of agreement and that of delivery.
For example, todays spot price of oil is used to trade oil to be delivered in at least 1 month.
expectation (Lucas Critique). However, this problem does not appear for non-policy innovations, like oil
price innovations.
19In terms of the general representation of A0 which I report in note 12, these assumptions amount to set
A1;30 and A
2;3
0 equal to zero.
20The proportion of crude traded at spot prices increased from the average 5% of the preceding period to
35 % in 1979.
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Moreover, the sharp increase in the oil price volatility, which followed the end of the OPEC
era, led to the creation of the oil future and forward market, which allowed reneries and oil
producers to hedge against sudden large changes in the price of oil.21
Spot
Forward spot
Spot linked
Term (1)
Term (2)
Term (3)
Evergreen
Life of field
Spot Price Continuum
single cargo, fixed price, delivery in a month
single cargo, fixed price, future delivery (2-3 month)
Spot sale at some relation to published spot prices
Source: Hartshorn (1993)
A commitemnt to lift crude from the field during its life on a price basis fixed at regular intervals in relation to the market
All supply arrangements are determined but the price is set cargo-by-cargo in relation to some open market price
Supply obligation at a fixed price but with frequent (often quarterly) price reopeners and with phase-out provisions
The more traditional sort of term transaction, over a period but with the price fixed at the time of agreement
As for term(2) but automatically renewable, with prices agreed at the time of the renewal
Table 1.2 - The Spot Price Continuum
Both the dominant use of term prices in the oil market and the development of the
oil futures and forward market make it plausible to suppose that at the time an oil price
innovation occurs, oil quantities and prices, for the present and the near future time, have
to a large extent already been settled.
It is also true that oil price changes, by acting on agentsexpectations, might contempo-
raneously a¤ect GDP. However, what is not clear is the time lag necessary for this to happen.
In fact, the oil market is characterized by a low price elasticity of both demand and supply
which makes it highly volatile. It follows that even a sharp change in the price of oil might be
regarded as temporary, as the mere consequence of the normal functioning of the oil market,
so that more than a quarter might be required for it to be e¤ectively incorporated in agent
expectations.22
21The rst attempt to develop an oil futures market dates back to 1935 in New York, but it did not
succeed. It started again in New York in 1974, then followed the Forward Contract Exchange Company
in Amsterdam (1974) and the International Petroleum Exchange in London (1981). The birth of a future
and forward market for oil reduced even further the power to control the price of oil. In fact, the oil future
market allows outsiders and speculators to intervene in the pricing process. It does not come as a surprise,
then, that the 1980s are often considered as the end of the era of the exogeneity of the price oil.
22This is the reason for Hamiltons proposal of the net measure of oil price and for Lee et al. proposal of
a second-moment based measure of the oil price. The former aimed at disregarding changes in the price of
oil that would be due to temporary movements of the supply and the demand; the latter aimed at creating
a measure of the price of oil which could take into account the change in the oil price volatility.
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1.4.2.3 The Standard Aggregate VAR (SA-VAR)
The Standard Aggregate VAR (SA-VAR) includes four variables: the log di¤erence of
aggregate real GDP (GDPt), the log di¤erence of the aggregate GDP deator (t), the Fed
fund rate (it) and the log di¤erence of a measure of the price of oil
 
P oilt

.2324 Denoting the
vector of endogenous variable by XSAt and the vector of reduced form residuals by U
SA
t the
reduced form VAR can be written as:
XSAt = B
SA (L)Xt 1 + USAt ;
where BSA(L) is a polynomial in the lag operator L, XSAt 

GDPt;t;P
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The vector of reduced form residuals is then a linear combination of the vector of struc-
tural errors or innovations "SAt 
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Lets consider a possible variable ordering such that ASA0 appears in the following re-
cursive form:
ASA0 =
0BBB@
1 0 0 0
GDP 1 0 0
oilGDP 
oil
 1 0
iGDP 
i
 
i
oil 1
1CCCA :
For the purpose of my analysis, the identication of all the parameters in ASA0 is not
necessary. In fact, as I am interested in Impulse Response Function (IRFs) to oil price
innovations, what I need is the matrix of parameters of the reduced form, BSA(L), and the
column of ASA0 relative to the oil price innovation. It is thus possible to assume, without
loss of generality, a recursive structure for the rst two rows of ASA0 ; corresponding to the
equations of GDP and t, as long as we are not interested in identifying their innovations.
I then perform the rough strategy and identify oil innovations and compute IRFs for any
possible variable ordering to check if results are not sensitive to any specic variable ordering.
23In VARs a commodity price index is sometimes used to eliminate the price puzzle (Sims 1992). I do
not consider it because the price puzzle inuences monetary policy innovations, while Bernanke, Gertler and
Watson (1997) report that its introduction does not change the e¤ects of oil price innovations. Further, I
consider the GDP deator and not the CPI index. This distinction matters as Barsky and Kilian (2001)
show that, theoretically, while the CPI index must increase after an oil price innovation the GDP deator
may take any direction, so that any price puzzle could be claimed.
24I use the software Jmulti to perform the Saikkonen & Luetkepohl cointegration test between the time
series of GDP, GDP deator and nominal oil price. The null hypothesis of zero cointegration rank is not
rejected when considering non zero mean and a deterministic trend and under di¤erent lag specications.
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1.4.2.4 The Disaggregated VAR (D-VAR)
The Disaggregated VAR (D-VAR) consists of six variables: the log di¤erence of the traded
good sector GDP deator (Mt ) , the log di¤erence of the non-traded good sector GDP
deator (St ), the log di¤erence of traded good sector GDP (GDP
M
tt ), the log di¤erence of
non-traded good sector GDP (GDP St ), the Fed Fund rate (it) and the log di¤erence of a
measure of the price of oil (Poil;t).
By denoting the vector of endogenous variable by ZDt and the vector of reduced form
residuals by UDt the reduced form VAR can be written as:
ZDt = B
D (L)Zt 1 + UDt ;
where BD(L) is a polynomial in the lag operator L,
ZDt =
0BBBBBBBB@
GDPMt
GDP St
Mt
St
P oilt
it
1CCCCCCCCA
: and UDt =
0BBBBBBBB@
uY
M
t
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t
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M
t
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t
uoilt
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1CCCCCCCCA
:
The vector of reduced form residuals is then a linear combination of the vector of struc-
tural errors or innovations "Dt 
h
"y
M
t ; "
yS
t ; "
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t ; "
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t ; "
oil
t ; "
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t
i
,
UDt = A
D
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t ;
It is then possible to apply to the D-VAR the same identication procedure I have
outlined for the SA-VAR and similarly perform the rough strategy to check if the IRFs to
oil innovations do not change signicantly as the order of the variables changes.
1.4.3 Do oil price innovations have similar e¤ects on the traded and the
non-traded goods sector?
To check whether oil price innovations have di¤erent e¤ects across sectors I estimate the
D-VAR and compute the IRF to a positive oil price innovation for four sectorial variables
(GDPMt ;GDP
S
t ;
M
t ;
S
t ). Moreover, I also estimate the SA-VAR to compare the results
between the aggregate and the disaggregate approach.
In the specication of the D-VAR I consider a non-zero constant and 4 lags. In the choice
of the number of lags I take into account the information criteria, previous empirical studies
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and the number of lags necessary to reject serial correlation and conditional heteroscedasticity
in the residuals.25 The number of lags suggested by the information criteria is at most three
(AIC and HQ) and with three lags I can exclude both serial correlation and heteroscedasticity
in the residuals. However, as the oil empirical literature shows that the most important lags
coe¢ cient are the fourth and the third, I decide to consider no fewer than 4 lags (see table
1.3)
Study Sample Period Lag With Greatest Coefficient Lag With second Greatest Coefficient
Hamilton (1983) 1949:II-1972:IV Fourth Quarter Third Quarter
Hamilton (1983) 1973:I-1980:IV Fourth Quarter Third Quarter
Gisser and Goodwin (1986) 1961:I-1982:IV Fourth Quarter Third Quarter
Mork (1989) 1949:I-1988:II Fourth Quarter Third Quarter
Raymond and Rich (1997) 1952:II-1995:III Fourth Quarter Third Quarter
Hamilton (2003) 1949:II-1999:IV Fourth Quarter Third Quarter
Summary of Most important Lag Coefficients in Previous Empirical Studies
of the Effects of Oil Price Shocks
Source Hamilton and Herrera (2004)
Table 1.3 - Summary of the most important lag coe¢ cients in past empirical studiies.
In the specication of the SA-VAR I consider a non-zero constant and 6 lags. The
information criteria deliver very di¤erent results: the Akaike criteria (AIC) reports 11 lags,
the Hannan and Quinn criteria (HQ) 3 and the Scwarz criteria (SC) 1. The choice of six
lags follows from the fact that it is the minimum number of lags necessary to reject serial
autocorrelation in the residuals.
In presenting the results I report the IRFs together with 95 % bootstrap condence
intervals.26
25I use the software Jmulti to compute the information criteria and to perform the residual analysis
(the Portmentau and the LM test for residual autocorrelation, performed at di¤erent lag lenghts, and the
univariate ARCH-LM test for conditional Heteroscedasticity)
26Bootstrap condence intervals are the 5% and 95% quantiles of the empirical distribution of the impulse
response of interest and are constructed following Efron and Tibshirani (1993). First, the residuals estimated
in the reduced form VAR are centered and a new dataset is computed using both the estimated parameters
and a drawn from centered errors. The new dataset is then used to obtain a new impulse response that
is stored. These steps are repeated 5000 times, and the condence interval is computed taking the values
which delimit the 5-95% interval of the empirical distribution of the impulse responses.
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Figure 1.4 - IRFs of GDP T
Figure 1.4 reports the response of GDP T to a 1% positive oil price innovation for any
of the three di¤erent measures of the price of oil (Brent, Mork and Hamilton). The pattern
of the IRF of GDP T is similar across di¤erent measures of the price of oil, but the size
of the trough is the largest with Mork measure and the smallest with the Brent measure.
For any measure of the price of oil the trough is reached at the 4th period and it is always
statistically signicant at the 10 percent level, but only when the Brent measure is adopted
there is also a statistically signicant e¤ect in the 2nd period.
In gure 1.5 I report the response of GDPN to a 1% positive oil price innovation for
any of the three di¤erent measures of the price of oil. For each measure of the price of oil
the IRF is never statistically signicant at the 10 percent level.
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Figure 1.5 - IRFs of GDPN
In gure 1.6 I report the response of T to a 1% positive oil price innovation for any of
the three di¤erent measures of the price of oil.
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Figure 1.6 - IRFs of T
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The pattern of Tt is similar across di¤erent measures of P
oil
t , but the size of the peak is
the largest for Mork measure and the smallest for the Brent measure. The impulse response
is statistically signicant at the 10 percent level either up to the 5th period (Hamilton, Mork)
or up to the 7th period (Brent), and the peak occurs either at the 4th (Mork, Hamilton) or
at the 5th period (Brent).
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Figure 1.7 - IRFs of N
In gure 1.7 I report the IRFs of N to a 1% positive oil price innovation for the three
di¤erent measures of the price of oil. The pattern of the IRF is pretty similar across di¤erent
measures of oil price, with a peak reached either at the 3rd (Mork, Brent) or at the 5th period
(Hamilton). The IRF is statistically signicant at the 10 percent level either for the rst 6
periods (Mork,Hamilton) or for the rst 10th period (Brent).
In general, I nd that in both sectors the size of the responses of both  and GDP is
the largest when I use Mork oil price measure, while when I use the Brent measure the
size of the responses is the smallest but it is statistically signicant for more periods. It is
also evident that the non-traded sector is less sensitive to oil innovations than the traded
sectors. Indeed, not only the size of the responses of both  (at the peak) and GDP (at
the trough) are much larger in the traded good sector than in the non-traded good sector,
but also the response of GDPN is never statistically signicant for any measure of the
price of oil.
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Test value No restr p-value*
H0: no GDP asymmetry across sectors 3,83 4 0,0043 Reject H0
H0: no inflation asymmetry across sectors 7,61 4 4,94E-07 Reject H0
H0: no GDP & inflation asymmetry across sectors 5,63 8 5,50E-03 Reject H0
 F tests in the non-standard VAR
* F ~(#,T-k):# is the no. of linear restriction, T=no. observations k= no.of parameters
Table 1.4 - testing the null hypothesis of identical direct e¤ects of oil price on the traded
and the non-traded goods sector.
Finally, I test the null hypothesis that the parameters which describe the e¤ect of lags
of P oil on time GDP Tt are statistically identical to those which describe the e¤ect of lags
of P oil on GDPNt . I also perform an analogous test for the parameters which describe
the e¤ect of lags of P oil on Tt and 
N
t .
These linear restrictions are tested through F tests, whose results are reported in table
1.4 with the null hypothesis that is always rejected. If I interpret the parameters which
describe the e¤ect of lags of P oil on a a time t variable as the direct e¤ect of the price of oil
on that variable I then conclude that data reject the hypothesis that the price of oil might
have a similar direct e¤ect across sectors.
1.4.3.1 A comparison between the aggregate and the disaggregate analysis of the oil-
macroeconomyrelationship
I use the results from the two VARs to make a comparison between the aggregate and the
disaggregate analysis of the oil-macroeconomy relationship. Thus, I have to create a synthetic
measure of the IRF of the aggregate  from T and N ; and one of aggregate GDP
from GDP T and GDPN . While I am aware that a simple weighted average of the
disaggregated impulse responses may be a poor measure for a comparison with the aggregate
impulse response, I consider this simply as an exercise which aims to grasp an intuition on
the possible e¤ects of the change in the composition of the economy on the strength of oil
price innovations.
I build up three synthetic IRFs of aggregate ination and GDP; where each IRF is a
GDP-weighted average of the IRFs of GDP T and GDPN but with di¤erent weights. In
the synthetic IRF labelled 1961-1970 the weight of any sector is its average GDP share
over the rst 10 years of the sample period; in the synthetic IRF labelled average the
weight of any sector is its average GDP share over the entire sample period (1961-2005); in
the synthetic IRF labelled 1996-2005 the weight of a sector is its average GDP share over
the last ten years of the sample period.
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In computing the synthetic IRFs I use Hamilton oil price measure because I observe that
its use often delivers results that are quantitatively half way between those obtained with
the other two oil price measures.
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Figure 1.8 - IRFs of aggregate GDP SA and synthetic aggregate GDPD
Figure 1.8 reports the three synthetic IRFs of aggregate GDPD and the IRF of
GDP SA. The IRF of the synthetic average aggregate GDPD is the natural measure to
be used for a comparison with the corresponding IRF of GDP SA, as in average GDPD
the weight of each sector is computed taking into account the entire sample period. The
IRFs of the other two synthetic aggregate GDPD, instead, help to get an intuition on
whether the change in the sectorial composition of the economy might change the response
of the aggregate economic activity.
I rst note that the pattern of the IRF of average aggregate GDPD has a pattern
similar to that of GDP SA. By comparing the size of the trough of the IRFs of the other
two synthetic aggregateGDPD I notice that the size of the trough of 1961-1970 aggregate
GDPD is larger than that of the 1996-2005 aggregate GDPD.
These results suggest that the change in the sectorial composition of the GDP might
partially explain the weakening of the e¤ects of oil innovations on US GDP.
In gure 1.9 I report the IRFs of the three synthetic aggregate D and the IRF of the
aggregate SA.
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Figure 1.9 - IRFs of aggregate SA and of synthetic aggregate D
The IRF of the averagesynthetic aggregate D and the corresponding IRF of aggregate
SA are pretty similar: both are statistically signicant at the 10 percent level at the 3rd,
4th and 5th period, and also show the same size at the peak. Moreover, by comparing the
IRFs of the other two aggregate synthetic D I observe no relevant di¤erences.
I interpret these results as a signal that the change in the sectorial composition of the
GDP does not seem to modify the e¤ects of oil innovations on aggregate .
1.4.4 Are the relationships between oil and the traded and the non-traded
goods sectors linear?
In this section I verify whether there is some evidence for non-linear e¤ects of oil in-
novations on both the traded and the non-traded goods sectors. For this, I follow Mork
(1989) and split the time series of the nominal price of oil into two time series: the rst one
comprises positive changes in the nominal price of oil and zero otherwise; the second one
comprises negative changes in the nominal price of oil and zeros otherwise.
I then perform a seven variable VAR composed of: positive nominal oil price changes 
P+oil;t

, negative nominal oil price changes
 
P oil;t

; log di¤erenced traded goods sector in-
ation (T;t), log di¤erenced non-traded goods sector ination (N;t), log di¤erenced traded
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goods sector GDP(GDPT;t), log di¤erenced non-traded goods sector GDP (GDPN;t), and
the Fed Fund Rate (it).
This modied Disaggregate VAR (MD-VAR) is fully specied with a non-zero constant
and four lags.27
I perform two tests to check for a linear relationship between the price of oil and any of
the two sectors. First, for each sector I compute the response of GDP and  to both a
positive and a negative oil price innovation. A linear relationship between oil and a specic
sector implies that sectorial variables should respond symmetrically to positive and negative
oil price innovations, that is with similar size but opposite sign.
Figure 1.10 shows the IRFs ofGDP to positive and negative oil price innovations in the
two sectors. The IRF of GDP appears to have an asymmetric pattern in both sectors, as
both positive and negative oil price innovations cause recessive e¤ects. The IRF of GDP T
is never statistically signicant after a negative oil price innovation, while it is signicant for
the rst nine periods after a positive oil price innovation. Instead, the IRF to both positive
and negative oil price innovations of GDPN shows some symmetry as it is almost never
statistically di¤erent from zero at the 10 percent level.
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Figure 1.10- IRFs of GDP T and GDPN to positive and negative oil price innovations
27The identication procedure is identical to that already illustrated apart from the further assumption of
no contemporaneous relationships between positive and negative oil price innovations.
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Figure 1.11 - IRFs of T and N to positive and negative oil price innovations
Figure 1.11 shows the IRF of both T and N to a positive and a negative oil price
innovation. The IRFs of N to the two innovations appear symmetric in the pattern, even
if both are almost never statistically signicant. The IRFs of T , instead, are slightly sym-
metric in the pattern, but while the IRF to negative oil price innovation is never statistically
di¤erent from zero, the IRF to positive oil price innovation is signicant for 4 periods (from
the 2nd to the 5th period).
To sum up, both N and GDPN might appear to be symmetric as the response of
the two variables to positive and negative oil price innovations is almost never signicantly
a¤ected by oil price innovations. The traded good sector, instead, appears to be asymmetric
as the IRFs of both the T and GDP T to a negative and positive oil price innovation
are asymmetric and almost never statistically signicant only in case of negative oil price
innovations.
The second test that I perform to check for non-linear e¤ects of oil innovations on the
two sectors is based on the Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (FEVD) of sectorial 
and GDP . The FEVD measures the contributions by any innovation in the VAR to the
h-step forecast error variance of the variable of interest. Thus, by comparing the contribution
of positive and negative oil price innovations to the FEVD of the variable of interest I may
assess whether positive and negative oil price innovations have similar e¤ects.
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For each variable of interests Table 6 presents the proportion of forecast error accounted
for by positive and negative oil price changes. The forecast error of both GDP T and
T , except for early forecast horizons, is more largely accounted for by positive oil price
innovations than by negative ones. I interpret these results as in favor of a non-linear
relationship between the price of oil and the traded goods sector.
The case of the non-traded good sector, instead, is di¤erent. Indeed, the contribution of
positive oil innovations to the forecast error of N is barely larger than that of negative ones
at almost any forecast horizon. As to the forecast error of the GDPN , table 1.5 shows
that the contribution of negative oil price innovations is slightly higher than that of positive
ones. I interpret this result as not in favor of a non-linear relationship between the price of
oil and non-traded good sector.
Forecast horizon positive oil % negative oil % positive oil % negative oil % positive oil % negative oil % positive oil % negative oil %
1 0 0 0 0 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
2 0,01 0,02 0,00 0,06 0,05 0,00 0,03 0,02
3 0,01 0,02 0,03 0,07 0,07 0,00 0,07 0,03
4 0,1 0,02 0,03 0,07 0,12 0,00 0,08 0,03
5 0,1 0,02 0,04 0,06 0,14 0,01 0,09 0,04
6 0,1 0,02 0,04 0,07 0,14 0,02 0,10 0,05
7 0,1 0,02 0,05 0,07 0,14 0,02 0,09 0,05
8 0,1 0,02 0,05 0,07 0,13 0,02 0,09 0,05
9 0,1 0,02 0,05 0,07 0,13 0,02 0,09 0,06
10 0,1 0,02 0,05 0,07 0,12 0,03 0,09 0,06
11 0,1 0,02 0,05 0,07 0,12 0,03 0,09 0,07
12 0,1 0,02 0,05 0,07 0,12 0,03 0,08 0,07
13 0,1 0,03 0,05 0,07 0,12 0,03 0,08 0,07
14 0,1 0,03 0,05 0,07 0,12 0,03 0,08 0,07
15 0,1 0,03 0,05 0,07 0,12 0,03 0,08 0,07
16 0,1 0,03 0,05 0,07 0,12 0,03 0,08 0,07
17 0,1 0,03 0,05 0,07 0,12 0,03 0,08 0,07
18 0,1 0,03 0,05 0,07 0,12 0,03 0,08 0,07
19 0,1 0,03 0,05 0,07 0,12 0,03 0,08 0,07
20 0,1 0,03 0,05 0,07 0,12 0,03 0,08 0,07
Table - Proportion of Forecast Error accounted for by positive and negative oil price changes in:
%GDP Manufacturing %GDP Services Inflation Manufacturing Inflation Services
Table 1.5 - Proportion of Forecast Error accounted for by positive and negative oil price
changes
To sum up, none of the tests appears to strongly reject a linear relationship between the
non-traded good sector and oil price, while a linear relationship between oil and the traded
1.4. VAR ANALYSIS 29
good sector is always rejected.
1.4.5 Why do oil price innovations matter less today than in the past?
In this section I test empirically whether it is plausible that the increasing economic
weight of the non-traded good sector might contribute to explain why oil price innovations
a¤ect the aggregate economic activity less today than in the past. Indeed, in the previous
sections I have observed both that over time the GDP share of the non-traded good sector
has increased at the expenses of that of the traded good sector and that the non-traded good
sector is less sensitive to oil price innovations than the traded good sector.
To nd whether data support the hypothesis of a composition e¤ectas further expla-
nation of the weakening of the oil-macroeconomy relationship I split the sample period of
the dataset into two subperiods and estimate the SA-VAR and the D-VAR for each of them.
By comparing the IRFs to a 1% positive oil price innovation across subperiods I can check
how stable is the oil-macroeconomyrelationship at both the aggregate and the sectorial
level. If the oil-macroeconomy relationship is more stable at the disaggregate level than at
the aggregate level, then data would not reject the possibility that the composition e¤ect
has a role in explaining the weakening of the oil-macroeconomy relationship.
To measure the weakening of the e¤ects of oil innovations on the economy I check how
both the size and the statistical signicance of the IRFs of  and GDP change across
subperiods. If I nd evidence that the IRFs estimated with the SA-VARs show a larger
weakening than the IRFs estimated with the D-VARs, I will interpret this result as in
favor of the hypothesis of a composition e¤ect at work in weakening the oil-macroeconomy
relationship.
I rst need to choose the breakpoint date of the oil-macroeconomy relationship. In the
oil literature the breakpoint is usually set in the rst half of the1980s (Ferderer 1996, Mork
1989, Lee et al. 1996 and Hooker 1996). However, as the composition e¤ect is also based on
the increase over time of the GDP share of the non-traded good sector, I also check for the
presence of a structural break in this time series through two kinds of Chow tests.28
28The time series shows a clear trend that might be either deterministic or stochastic. I use the software
Jmulti to perform a unit root test with structural break which excludes the presence of unit root or
stochastic trend. The Data Generating Process of the time series is then well represented by a AR(1) with
a deterministic time trend.
I use the software Jmulti to perform the break-point Chow Test and the sample-split Chow test. The two
tests provide bootstrapped p-values that are based on 5000 repetitions.
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Figure 1.12
Figure 1.13
Both Chow tests reveal the presence of a structural break exactly in the early 1980s
(gures 1.12 and 1.13). In the choice of the breakpoint date I further take into account the
fact that in 1979 the oil market experienced a structural change with the end of the OPEC
era. One of the consequences of this change has been the huge increase in the volatility
of the price of oil in the post-80 period with respect to the pre-80 period.29 Therefore,
by considering the results from oil literature, the specic history of the oil market and the
presence of a structural break in the time series of the GDP share of the non-traded good
sector, I decide to set the breakpoint date at 1979:Q4.30 It follows that I label before 1980s
any VAR which is estimated with the 1960:Q2-1979:Q4 subperiod dataset, and after 1980s
any VAR estimated with the 1980:Q1-2005:Q4 subperiod dataset.
29In particular, Lee et al. (1994) and Ferderer (1996) report that the standard deviation of the crude oil
PPI growth rate in the post-80 period was about three times greater than in the pre-80 period.
30I also perform the analysis for another breakpoint date, the one that both Chow tests reported as a
breakpoint date: 1982:4, and results do not change much.
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In the empirical estimation I use all the three measures of the price of oil, and in the
specication of the VARs I always consider a non-zero constant and four lags.
From Pre-1980 to post-1980
Size (trough or peak) Pre-1980 Post-1980
S-VAR %GDP Decrease(B,H,M) Yes (B,H,M) No (B,H,M)
%GDP Man Decrease(B,H,M) Yes (B,H,M) Yes (B,M) / No(H)
%GDP Serv Stable(H,M) / Decrease(B) No (B,H,M) No (H,M)/ Yes(B)
S-VAR Inflation Decrease(B,H,M) Yes (B,H,M) Yes (B,H,M)
Inflation Man Decrease (B,H,M) Yes (B,H,M) Yes (B,H,M)
Inflation Serv Decrease (B,M) / Increase (H) No (B,H,M) Yes (B,H,M)
H=Hamilton; M=Mork;B=Brent
Significancy (trough or peak)
 of sectorial and aggregate %GDP and inflation
Table - synthesis of the changes across subperiods in the response to positive oil price innovations
D-VAR
D-VAR
Table 1.6
Table 1.6 synthesizes how changes across subperiods the IRF to oil price innovations of
GDP and  at both aggregate and the sectorial level. At the aggregate level, there is
a clear evidence of a large weakening of the e¤ect of oil price innovations on the economy.
Indeed, the size and the statistical signicance of the IRFs to oil price innovations of both
GDP SA and SA (g. 1.14) get reduced in the post-1980ssubperiod. In particular, the
response of GDP SA in the post-1980ssubperiod becomes statistically not signicant at
any horizon for any of the three oil price measures.
At the sectorial level, instead, the weakening of the e¤ects of oil innovations is less evident
(gure 1.15-1.19). Indeed, while on one side the IRFs to oil price innovations of both T
and GDP T get reduced in the size when estimated in the post-1980ssubperiod, on the
other there is not loss of statistical signicance at the trough response of GDP T (apart for
Hamilton measure) or at the peak response of T .
The case of the non-traded sector is even more interesting. The response ofGDPN gets
reduced in size in the after 1980ssubperiod only for one oil price measure out of three.
Moreover, the IRF of GDPN becomes statistically signicative at the trough in the after
1980ssubperiod when the Brent measure is used. Similarly, the response of N also becomes
statistically signicant at the peak when estimated in the post 1980ssubperiod, and for
any oil price measure, even though the size of the response gets reduced for two oil-price
measure out of three.
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Figure 1.14 - IRFs of GDP and GDP in the pre-1980and post-1980ssubperiod
(Hamilton)
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Figure 1.15 - IRFs of GDP T and GDPN in the pre-1980and post-1980ssubperiod
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Figure 1.16 - IRFs of GDP T and GDPN in the pre-1980and post-1980ssubperiod
(Brent)
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Figure 1.17 - IRFs of GDP T and GDPN in the pre-1980and post-1980ssubperiod
(Mork)
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Figure 1.18 - IRFs of T and N in the pre-1980and post-1980ssubperiod (Hamilton)
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Figure 1.19 - IRFs of T and N in the pre-1980and post-1980ssubperiod (Brent)
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Figure 1.20 - IRFs of T and N in the pre-1980and post-1980ssubperiod (Mork)
1.5 Conclusions
The main results emerging from my analysis are three. First, I provide evidence that the
e¤ects of oil price innovations on both the sectorial GDP and  are larger in the traded
good sector than in the non-traded good sector.
Second, I show that while data reject a linear relationship between oil and the traded
good sector they cannot reject a linear relationship between oil and the non-traded good
sector.
Third, I show that the weaker e¤ects of oil price innovations on the responses of both
GDP and  are more evident at the aggregate than at the disaggregate level. I then
argue that data do not reject the possibility of a composition e¤ect at work, that is that the
increase of the GDP share of the non-traded goods sector contributes to partially explain
the weakening of the oil-macroeconomy relationship in the US.
Appendices
1.A: Computing the time series of the markup
^it =
e  sk
e  esk y^
i
t +
(1  e)sk
e  esk k^
i
t  
sH
1  sk h^
i
t   w^it ; i = T;N ;
where  is the markup, e is the input elasticity of substitution between capital and labor,
sk and sH are, respectively, the labor and the capital share of value added, h stands for the
number of hours worked, w is the real wage, andi = M stands for traded good sector while
i = S stands for Services and t : 1947  ! 2003. A Hodrick-Prescott lter is then applied to
extract the business cycle component from the time series.
I need to assume some values for the steady state markup () and the elasticity of
input substitution (e). As pointed out by Woodford and Rotemberg (1996), it is extremely
di¢ cult to calibrate the elasticity of input substitution (e). The di¢ culty arises from the fact
that the elasticity may vary according to the temporal horizon considered and the assumed
production function. For example, a putty-clay production function requires an elasticity of
substitution lower in the short run than in the long run, while the assumption of cyclical
capital utilization implies exactly the opposite. As there is no agreement on the right value
I opt for estimating the time series for the markup under di¤erent values of e, notably e
2 [0.75, 1, 1.25].
As to the steady state value for the markup I estimate it for both sectors following
Hall (1988). The two sectorial estimates of the markup are fairly close. Thus, I consider a
common value for both sectors equal to  =1.55. I perform the analysis for three possible
values of the input elasticities but I report the results only for the case of e=1.25, as by
changing the value of the input elasticity the results do not change much. Notably, since
markup uctuations are reduced with larger values of e; the results that I report are the
most conservative, that is they are those for which the uctuations in the markup are the
smallest.
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CHAPTER 2
A THEORETICAL EXPLANATION OF THE DECREASING
IMPACT OF OIL SHOCKS ON US GDP
2.1 Introduction
Over the last decades the e¤ects of oil shocks on US economic activity have been
decreasing. This phenomenom, which is commonly dened as the weakening of the oil-
macroeconomyrelationship, has then been variously explained either emphasizing the role
of monetary policies, or that of more e¢ cient technologies, or as a consequence of the "great
moderation, as it is commonly labelled the global trend of large reduction in business cycle
volatility.
In this paper I ask whether and to what extent a change in the sectorial composition of
GDP may explain the decreasing impact of oil shocks on economic activity. Two empirical
pieces of evidence motivate this analysis. Firstly, the increase of the GDP share of the non-
traded good sector at the expense of that of the traded good sector over the last decades.
Secondly, the fact that the non-traded goods sector is less sensitive to the e¤ects of oil shocks
than the traded good sector:
The analysis is based on a two-country, two-sector model, with traded and non-traded
intermediate goods which are produced with oil, labor and sector-specic capital. The model
is then able to reproduces the larger impact of oil price shocks on the traded good sector
through consumption smoothing. In particular, for this result to hold I assume that the
investment good is composed only of traded goods, while the consumption good is composed
of both traded and non-traded goods.
I then use the model to perform an experiment in which I analyse if an increase of the
GDP share of the non traded good sector changes the way oil shocks a¤ect the economic
activity. In order to reproduce this structural change I refer to the two mechanisms which
the literature puts forward: the utility-based and the unbalanced productivity growth
(UPG) mechanism. The rst mechanism is based on the idea that the increase of GDP share
of the non-traded good sector is induced by households preferences. The second mechanism,
instead, relies on di¤erent growth rates of total factor productivities (TFP) across sectors,
which in turn induce an increase of the share of the slowest-growing sector
44
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To perform the experiment based on the UPG mechanism it is necessary to determine
some constraints on the demand side of the economy which must be fullled in the model,
other than understanding how in the model the oil-macroeconomy relationship is directly
a¤ected by increasing TFPs. In order to nd an analytical answer to these two problems
I set-up a basic model which allows for a closed form solution. I then show that the only
demand condition which must be satised is that the elasticity of substitution between traded
and non-traded goods be su¢ ciently small, namely below unity. Furthermore, I nd that in
an international framework it is a su¢ cient condition that a UPG mechanism be at work
abroad to experience a structural change domestically a change in the sectoral composition
of the economy. Finally, I contribute to the debate on the e¤ects of technological progress
on the oil-macroeconomy relationship by showing that with Cobb Douglas technology the
oil price elasticity of GDP is not a¤ected by changes in total factor productivities.
The experiment, for both mechanisms, shows that the increase of the GDP share of
the non traded good sector has a marginal explanatory power for the weakening of the oil-
macroeconomy relationship, which in turn is mainly caused by the induced reduced size of
international spillovers.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the relevant literature. Section
3 presents the model. Section 4 describes the experiment and presents results. Section 5
concludes.
2.2 Literature
Hooker (1996) and Hamilton(1996) rst highlighted that the e¤ects of oil shocks on US
economic activity have weakened after the 1980s, an evidence that has been conrmed by
Hooker (1999), Loungani and Yücel (2000), Brown and Yücel (1999) and Blanchard and
Galì (2007).
The literature has then o¤ered di¤erent theoretical explanations. A rst argument,
referred to here as the oil-intensity argument, is based on the idea that the technological
progress, by reducing the oil intensity, that is the quantity of oil which is required to produce
a unit of output, has in turn weakened the e¤ect of oil shocks on economic activity (Brown
and Yücel 1995, Pomarantz and Robber 2005, Blanchard and Galì 2007). In this respect,
Pomarantz and Robber (2005) provide evidence that oil intensity has declined in all G-7
countries, with the US, for example, requiring a quarter less of oil per unit of output in 2003
than it did in the early1980s. However, the e¤ective relevance of the oil-intensity argument is
debated in the literature: Bohi (1991), for example, does not nd any statistically signicant
evidence that the most oil-intensive industries are those most a¤ected by oil price shocks in
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the 1970s.
Loungani and Yücel (2000) and Brown (2000), argue that the disruptive e¤ects of the
large oil price increase in the 1990s has been reduced by the contemporaneous verifying of
both a strong productivity growth in the US and a strong global GDP growth expansions.
A third argument explains the weakening of the oil-macroeconomy relationship focusing
on the interaction between monetary policy and oil price shocks. Some authors (Bohi 1991,
Bernanke et al. 1997, Blanchard and Galì 2007) argue that the recessive e¤ects of positive oil
price shocks are principally due to the restrictive response of monetary policy. Thus, they
attribute the weakening of the oil-macroeconomy relationship to a better conduct of the
monetary policy, which learnt how to react to oil price shocks after the dramatic experience
of the 70s and 80s. 1 In the opposite direction move Hamilton and Herrera (2000) and Leduc
and Sylvain (2005), who instead challenge the view that monetary policy is key element in
the mechanism of propagation of oil price shocks.
Hooker (1996) and Lee et al. (1996) explore the possibility that the weakening of the
e¤ects of oil shocks on US economy be the result of a statistical breakdown in the oil-
macroeconomy relationship and try to reestablish it focusing on mismeasurement problems.
Hooker considers three sources of mismeasurement: the uneven distribution of oil price shocks
over the sample period, the endogeneity of the price of oil after 1973 and the occurrence of
structural shocks in many US macro series. He concludes that even taking into account
these sources of mismeasurement it is not possible to reestablish a stable oil-macroeconomy
relationship over all the sample period. Lee et al. instead show that once the sharp increase
of the oil price volatility in the 1980s is taken into account, it is possible to reestablish a
stable oil-macroeconomy relationship over all the sample period.
Finally, the weakening of the oil-macroeconomy relationship is also interpreted in con-
nection to the great moderation, with the increasing exibility of labor markets and the
deepening of international nancial markets regarded as principally causes of both phenom-
ena.
Empirical evidence on the increasing GDP share of the non traded good sector is re-
ported, among others, by De Gregorio et al (1993). In general, this is a consequence of
the increase of the GDP share of services (i.e. Kravis 1983, Kuznets 1966, Maddison 1980),
which, to a rough approximation, represent the main component of the non-traded goods
sector (i.e. Canzoneri et al 1996, Kravis et al. 1982). Empirical evidence of oil price shocks
producing di¤erent e¤ects on the non-traded and the non-traded goods sector is provided by
1Hooker (1999), for example, argues that when Volcker took over the chair of the Federal Reserve the
monetary policy become less accommodating to oil price shocks than in the past and no longer triggered
expectations of higher ination.
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Maravalle (2007). Finally, theoretical explanations of the mechanisms behind the increase of
the GDP share of non-traded good sector are in Baumol (1967), Baumol et al. (1985), Ngai
and Pissarides(2004), and De Gregorio et al (1993).
2.3 The baseline model
Figure 2.1 - Structure of the model
Figure 2.1 presents the structure of the two country, two-sector model which is a modied
version of Pesenti (2003). The two countries, Home and Foreign, are inhabited by innitely-
lived households and are symmetric in every respect except for oil that is a Foreign-specic
resource but whose price (Pe) is denominated in Home currency. Each country is composed
of a competitive nal good sector and a monopolistic competitive intermediate sector. The
intermediate sector produces di¤erentiated varieties of traded and non-traded goods through
a CES production function which uses labor, capital and oil as inputs. The nal good
sector produces the consumption good by aggregating domestic and foreign traded goods
and domestic non-traded goods. Labor is mobile within the country and immobile across
countries. Capital is a sector-specic input that is complementary to oil.
Households can trade in country specic contingent bonds, so that perfect risk sharing
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is assumed within each country. In addition, households share the same preferences and
have the same initial level of wealth (or identical budget constraint), therefore it is possible
to assume a representative agent within each country. The characterization of the nancial
market is then completed with the introduction of a domestic and an international one-
period riskless bond, with the latter denominated in Foreign currency. However, in such
a framework any shock a¤ecting the real interest rates would also change the steady state
of the economy, implying a virtual loss of signicance of the approximation to the steady
state. The problem is overcome by the introduction of nancial transaction cost (Pesenti
2003, Benigno 2004, Erceg et al 2006) that Home households su¤er when they hold the
international bond.2
In what follow I present the detailed set-up of the model for the case of Home: the case
of Foreign is almost perfectly symmetric I also follow the convention of marking with an
asterisk Foreign prices and quantities.
2.3.1 Households
Population is normalised to 1, and a generic household j must decide the ow of Con-
sumption (Ct+i), Investment (It+i), sector-specic capitals (KH;t+1+i; KN;t+1+i), nominal
wage (Wt+i), domestic Bond (Bt+1+i) and international Bond (Bt+1+i) to maximise the
present value of the ow of instant utilities subject to the ow of intertemporal budget
constraints and the laws of motion of sector-specic capital:
Max
fCt;It;Kt+1;Wt;Bt+1;Bt+1g
Et
1X
i=0
i
"
(Ct+i(j))
1 
1   + 
(1  Lt+i(j))1+
1 + 
#
; s:t:
Bt+i+1(j) + "t+iB

t+i+1(j)  "t+iBt+i(j)(1 + it+i) (1  t+i) Bt+i(j)(1 + it+i)
= Wt+i(j)Lt+i(j)  Pt+iCt+i(j)  P It+iIt+i(j) +RN;t+iKN;t+i(j) +RH;t+iKH;t+i(j)
+ft+i(j) + 
b
t+i(j)
KH;t+i+1(j) = KH;t+i(j)(1  ) + IH;t+i(j)
KN;t+i+1(j) = KN;t+i(j)(1  ) + IN;t+i(j):
 2 (0; 1) is the intertemporal discount factor,  > 0 is the inverse of the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution,  > 0 and  > 0 characterize labor disutility,  2 (0; 1) is the
2In the literature there are other possibilities to correct for the stabilization of the steady state: Mendoza
introduces an endogenous rate of preference ; Cardia (1991) assumes a nite probability of death so that the
subjective discount rate becomes a function of nancial wealth; Cole and Obstfeld (1991) adopt a specic
kind of utility so that price exibility automatically ensures perfect insurance of consumption.
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depreciation rate, Pt+iis the price of a unit of consumption good Ct+i, P It+i is the price of a
unit of investment good It+i, it+i and it+i are the one period riskless nominal interest rates set
by Home and Foreign monetary policy authorities, RH;t+i and RF;t+i are the nominal rates of
return on capital in the traded and the non-traded goods sector, Bt+i+1(j) is the value of the
stock of Home bond held by household j, Bt+i+1(j) is the value of the stock of international
bond held by household j, "t+i is the nominal exchange rate, 
f
t+i(j) is household j share of
prots of the intermediate sector and bt+i(j) is households j share of prots of the nancial
transaction sector.
Financial transaction costs, t+i; are dened as follows:
t+i = 
1

exp2("t+iB

t+i=Pt+i 1)  1
exp2("t+iB

t+i=Pt+i 1) + 1
;
and depend on Bt+1
Pt+1
; the real value of the aggregate stock of international bond held by
Home households at the beginning of the period t+i; and on the parameters 1 > 0 and 
2
 2
[0; 1] :
Wage Setting Mechanism
The wage is set through a monopolistic competitive mechanism as each household sup-
plies a di¤erentiated labor input to wage-taker rms in the intermediate sector. It follows
that in setting the wage each household takes into account the aggregate demand for its
labor specic input Lt(j):
Lt(j) =
Z
LTj (i
T )diT +
Z
LNj (i
N)diNLt(j) = Lt

Wt(i)
Wt
 L
3
By assuming that all rms share identical preferences over di¤erentiated labor inputs, it
is possible to assume that each rm uses a labor aggregator á la Dixit-Stiglitz:
Lt =
24 1Z
0
Lt(j)
1  1
L dj
35
L
L 1
;
where L > 1 is the elasticity of substitution among di¤erentiated labor inputs. The
aggregate nominale wage Wt is dened as:
Wt =
Z
Wt(j)
1
1 L dj
1 L
;
3The labor demand for a di¤erentiated labor inputs is obtained by solving the rmsproblem of prot
maximization in the intermediate sector.
Lt(j) =
R
T
Lt(t; j)dt+
R
N
Lt(t; n)dn

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and is interpreted as the wage that minimizes the cost of a unit of aggregate labor L:
2.3.2 Firms
2.3.2.1 The Final Good Sector
The nal good sector produces a consumption good and an investment good in a perfect
competitive framework.
The consumption good
The consumption good Ct is a CES aggregator of an index of domestic non-traded goods
(Nt) and of an index of traded goods (Tt):
Ct =

!
1
C
C T
1  1
C
t + (1  !C)
1
C N
1  1
C
t
 C
C 1
;
where C > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between Tt and Nt and !C 2 (0; 1) denes
the proportion between Tt and Nt in Ct.
Tt is a CES aggregator of HC;t and FC;t, which are aggregators of, respectively, di¤eren-
tiated Home and Foreign traded good varieties, and each variety is dened over a continuum
index of unit measure:
Tt =

!
1
T
H H
C 1  1
T
t + (1  !H)
1
T F
C 1  1
T
t
 T
T 1
HC;t =
24 1Z
0
HC;t(h)
1  1
H dj
35
H
H 1
; FC;t =
24 1Z
0
FC;t(f)
1  1
F dj
35
F
F 1
Nt =
24 1Z
0
Nt(n)
1  1
N dj
35
N
N 1
:
T > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between Ht and Ft, and !H 2 (0; 1) denes the
proportion between Ht and Ft in Tt: H ; F ; N > 1 are the elasticities of input substitution
which determine the degree of substitutability across varieties in, respectively, Tt; HC;t andNt.
Pt; is dened as the price index which minimizes the expenditure of one unit of the
consumption; a similar denition applies to PT;t; the price index of Tt :
Pt =
h
!CP
1 C
T;t + (1  !C)P 1 CN;t
i 1
1 C ; PT;t =
h
!HP
1 T
H;t + (1  !H)P 1 TF;t
i 1
1 T :
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The investment good
The investment good It is a CES aggregator of Home (HI;t) and Foreign traded goods
(FI;t) :
It =

!
1
I
I H
1  1
I
I;t + (1  !I)
1
I F
1  1
I
I;t
 I
I 1
;
where I > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between HI;t and FI;t, and !I 2 (0; 1) denes
the proportion between HI;t and FI;t in It.
HI;t =
24 1Z
0
HI;t(h)
1  1
H dj
35
H
H 1
; FI;t =
24 1Z
0
FI;t(f)
1  1
F dj
35
F
F 1
:
HI;t and FI;t are aggregators of, respectively, Home and Foreign di¤erentiated varieties of
traded goods, where each variety is dened over a continuum index of unit measure. H ; F >
1 are the elasticities of input substitution, and determine the degree of substitutability across
di¤erentiated varieties in, respectively, HI;t and FI;t:
The price of a unit of investment good is dened as the price index which minimizes the
expenditure of one unit of the investment good:
PI;t =
h
!IP
1 I
H;t + (1  !I)P 1 IF;t
i 1
1 I :
2.3.2.2 The Intermediate Sector
The intermediate sector produces di¤erentiated varieties of traded and non-traded goods
in a monopolistic competition setting.
The traded goods sector
The traded good sector consists of an innite number of rms of unit mass, indexed by
h 2 (0; 1). Each rm uses a Cobb Douglas technology to produce a di¤erentiated variety of
the traded good (H(h)) using capital ( KT (h)) Labor (LT (h)) and oil (eT (h)):
Ht(h) = ZT;t (Lt(h))
(1 )


1
 e
1

T;t(h)K
T
t (h)
1  1

:
ZT;t > 0 is the total factor productivity that is common to all rms in the traded good
sector, (1   ) determines how total income is distributed between labor and the bunch of
capital and oil, and  > 1 is a parameter which determines the degree of substitutability
between capital and energy.. The Production of every variety h must satisfy the domestic
demand (HT;t(h); HI;t(h)), and the foreign demand,
 
HT;t(h); H

I;t(h)

:
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Ht(h) = HT;t(h) +HI;t(h) +H

T;t(h) +H

I;t(h)
The non-traded goods sector
The non-traded goods sector consists of an innite number of rms of unit mass, indexed
by n 2 (0; 1). Each rm uses a Cobb Douglas technology to produce a di¤erentiated variety
of the non-traded good N(n); using Capital (KN(n)), Labor (LN(n)) and oil (eN(n)) :
Nt(n) = (ZN;tLN;t(n))
(1 )


1
 e
1

N(n)KN;t(n)
1  1

:
ZN;t > 0 is the total factor productivity that is common to all rms in the non-traded
good sector, (1 ) determines how total income is distributed between labor and the bunch
of capital and oil, and  > 1 is a parameter which determines the degree of substitutability
between capital and energy.
The aggregate labor demand for the j-th labor input
Cost minimization determines the i-th rm demand for the j-th di¤erentiated labor
service Lt(i; j):
min
flt(i;j)g
1Z
0
Wt(j)Lt(i; j)dj ; s:t: Lt(i) =
24 1Z
0
Lt(i; j)
1  1
L dj
35
L
L 1
:
that leads to
Lt(i; j) = Lt(i)

Wt(j)
Wt
 L
By aggregating over traded and non-traded good intermediate sector rms, it is possible
to obtain the aggregate labor demand for the j-th di¤erentiated labor input:
Z
T
Lt(t; j)dt+
Z
N
Lt(j; n)dn =

Wt(j)
Wt
 L Z
T
Lt(j)dt+
Z
N
Lt(n)dn

= Lt(i)

Wt(j)
Wt
 L
2.3.3 Monetary Policy
Monetary policy is assumed to follow a Taylor rule
it = M it 1 + (1  M) (t   ) + (1  )Y (Yt   Y ) + "M;t
M 2 (0; 1) is the parameter which determines the degree of persistence of the interest
rate: ;Y > 0 determine, respectively, how the monetary authority react to deviation of
the ination rate to the ination target and to the output gap.
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2.3.4 Aggregate resource constraint
By aggregating the budget constraint over households it is possible to dene the current
account of Home country as the sum of the Net factor payment and of the trade balance:
CAt = "t
 
Bt+1  Bt

= it "tB

t
NET FACTOR PAYMENT
+ PH;tH

t
EXPORTS
  PF;tFt   Pe;tet
IMPORTS
H

t = H

C;t +H

I;t ; Ft = FC;t + FI;t ; et = eN;t + eH;t:
2.3.5 Exogenous processes
In the model there are ve exogenous variables, the four total factor productivities
(ZH;t; ZF;t; ZN;t; ZN;t) and the real price of oil (Pe;t). I assume that in logs they all follow a
stationary AR(1) process with zero covariance across error terms:
E("k;t; "j;t) =
(
0; k 6= j
j; k = j
)
; for k; j 2 (H;F;N;N; e) ;
0BBBBBB@
lnZH;t
lnZF;t
lnZN;t
lnZN;t
lnPe;t
1CCCCCCA =
0BBBBBB@
H 0 0 0 0
0 F 0 0 0
0 0 N 0 0
0 0 0 N 0
0 0 0 0 e
1CCCCCCA
0BBBBBB@
lnZH;t 1
lnZF;t 1
lnZN;t 1
lnZN;t 1
lnPe;t 1
1CCCCCCA+
0BBBBBB@
"H;t
"F;t
"N;t
"N;t
"e;t
1CCCCCCA
The price of oil
In the model the oil market is not explicitly modelled. In particular, the real price of oil
is assumed to be exogenous, and at that price any quantity of oil that is demanded may be
satised without inducing variations in the price. A possible interpretation of this horizontal
oil supply is that oil is an unlimited resource that is produced in a perfect competitive market
through a constant return to scale technology. It follows that the constant marginal cost
is exogenously determined, so that it is possible to interpret an exogenous oil price shock
as a supply shock. A consequence of this simplifying assumption is that the price of oil is
not does not react to the interaction between demand and supply but only to (exogenous)
supply shocks.
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2.3.6 Parametrization of the baseline model
Parameters US (Home) Rest of the World (F)
Intertemporal Discount Rate - β 0,9975 0,9975
Depreciation Rate on Capital - δ 0,025 0,025
Inverse of The Intertemporal Elasticity of Subst.- σ 2,00 2,00
Labor disutility parameter 1 - γ 2,00 2,00
Labor disutility parameter 2 - τ 1,00 1,00
Elasticity of Input subst. for Consumption - ρC 0,50 0,50
Elasticity of Input subst. for Intermediate Goods - ρT 2,00 2,00
Elasticity of Input subst. for Investment Goods - ρI 2,00 2,00
Elasticity of Subst. across Tradeable varieties - θH,θF 6,00 6,00
Elasticity of Subst. across Non-Tradeable varieties - θN,θN? 6,00 6,00
Elasticity of Subst. across varieties of labor - θN,θN? 6,00 6,00
Relative weight of Trad. in Cons.Good -  wc (wc*) 0,47 0,47
Relative weight of Trad.  in Inv.Good - wI 0,50 0,50
Proportion between H and F Trad. in Cons.Good - wH (wF) 0,50 0,50
Proportion between H and F Trad. in Inv.Good - wI 0,50 0,50
Labor Share Income - (1-α) 0,66 0,66
Elast.of Subst. between Capital and Energy - υ 5,00 5,00
Financial Transaction cost parameter 1 - φΣ
1 0,80 NA
Financial Transaction cost parameter 2 - φΣ² 1,50 NA
Degree of Persistence in Monetary Policy - ρM 0,00 0,00
Weight of Inflation Gap in Mon.Policy - Θπ 0,00 0,00
Weight of Output Gap in Mon.Policy - ΘY 1,50 1,50
Steady-State Ratios US (Home) Rest of the World (F)
Number of hours worked in the day1 0,3 0,28
Ratio of traded to non-traded goods 43% 44%
Ratio oil costs-to-GDP 5,00% 4,50%
Consumption to GDP ratio 82% 82%
1 The day is normalised to unity
Table 1a - Assumptions about Parameters - Baseline Model
Table 2.1 Parametrisation - Baseline Model
Table 2.1 lists the parameters and the values they assume in the baseline model. I adopt
the following strategy in the parametrization. First, preference and technolgy parameters
are set equal for Home and Foreign, so that oil price shocks may have asymmetric e¤ects
only because of asymmetries in the oil market, namely for oil being a foreign-specic resource
whose price is denominated in home currency. Second, most parameters are set in the range
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of similar macro simulation analysis (i.e.Bayoumi, Laxton and Pesenti 2004, Smets and
Wouters 2002, Erceg Guerrieri and Gust 2003), and only for a few specic parametriation
is adopted. Finally, the parametrization also aims at matching some steady state ratios. In
particular, as the main interest of the analysis is to observe how structural changes might
have a¤ected the propagation mechanism of oil price shocks after the 1970s, in the baseline
model Home steady state values matche beginning of the 1970s US ratios. The steady state
ratios that are taken into account in the parametrization are: the GDP weight of the traded
good sector, the consumption -to-investment ratio, the share of GDP represented by the
cost of energy and the number of hours worked as a fraction of the day. It follows below a
parameter-by-parameter explanation of the values chosen.
The discount factor  is set equal to 0:9975; and the capital depreciation rate  is
set equal to 0:025; so that the steady state rate of return on capital is around 3.5%. The
inverse of the intertemporal elasticities of substitution, () is set equal to 2. In standard real
business cycle theory this parameter is usually set close to 1, but it is usual to nd greater
values in similar analysis (1.5 in both Smets and Wouters 2002 and Bayoumi et al 2004), and
empirical analyses suggest for the US large values for  (Yogo 2000;Hall 1988 both conclude
for value close to 5, Favero 2005):I then opt for a value of 2 that is in the middle of the
ranges of possible values.
The parameters that dene the degree of monopolistic power in the intermediate sector
(H ; N ; F ; 

N) ; and those that determine the monopolistic power held by wage-setters
(L; 

L) ; are assumed identical across countries and sectors, and suh that imply a markup
of 20% over the marginal cost (for rms) adn the intratemporal labor-leisure substitution
(for wage-setter). The parameters that dene labor disutlity (; ;  ;  ) are set so that in
steady state the number of hours worked is in the range 0.25 - 0.33.
The parameters that determine the relative composition of the consumption good be-
tween tradeable and non-tradeables (!C) are set equal to 0.47, so that the proportion between
traded and non-traded goods of Home matches that of the US in the early 70s ( around
41%, the average share over the period 1965-1976). I also set (!H ; !H ; !I ; !

I) equal to 0.5
so that I assume no home bias in the use of domestic tradeables for the composition of both
the consumption and the investment good.
The parameters which determine the elasticity of substitution between Home and Foreign
traded goods in the investment and traded good aggregator (I ; 

I ; H ; 

H) are set equal to
2, a value in the middle of the range of previous macro simulation analysis .
The parameters that determine the elasticity of substitution between traded and non-
traded goods in the consumption good (C ; 

C ; ) are set equal equal to 0.5. This choice is
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motivated by a demand-side requirement value of (C ; 

C ; ) lower than unity that has to
be fulllled for an unbalanced productivity growth mechanism to be able to increase the
economc share of the slowest growing sector.4
The nancial transaction cost parameters
 
;1; ;2

are set ;1 = 0:8 and ;2 =
1:55;and the values for monetary policy parameters are set as follows: M ; 

M ;Y ;

Y = 0,
and ; = 1:5.
6
The GDP weight of the oil share is determined by (; ); the technology parameters,
and by ; that determines the share of output represented by the non labor income.  is
set to the standard value of one third, and  is set in order to have a value of the GDP oil
share around 5%, which is the average value for the US over the period 1970-20047. The
persistence of oil price shocks oil, is set by estimating the an AR(1) process for the time
series of the real oil price. I then set oil =0.9, which is the value corresponding to the lower
end of the 95 percent condence.8
The real price of oil is denominated in Home consumption units and is normalised to 1.
Analogously, the parameters that dene the total factor productivity at the sectorial level
(ZH ; ZF ; ZN ; ZN) are normalised to unity.
As the model cannot be solved in a closed form solution I approximate it around a steady
state and solve the corresponding linear expectation model by mean of the Uhlig algorithm.
2.4 The Experiment
In order to verify whether and to what extent the increase of the economic share of
the non-traded goods sector can weaken the oil-macroeconomy relationship I perform an
experiment in which I induce a structural change in the model. I refer to the two mechanisms
that the literature put forward to explain a structural change: the utility-basedand the
unbalanced productivity growth(UPG) mechanism. The rst mechanism is based on the
idea that the increase of the economic weight of the non-traded good sector is induced by
households preferences. The second mechanism, instead, relies on di¤erent growth rates of
4This result is similar to that found by Ngai and Pissarides (2004), and respect the intuition of Baumols
claim about the need for a su¢ cient inelastic demand for the UPG to increase the share of the slowest-growing
sector.
5I also tried other values, but the results of the experiment I perform are not sensitive to change in the
values of these parameters.
6As the experiment is performed under price exibility, the results are not a¤ected by the specic para-
metrization of the monetary policy rule.
7The GDP oil share is computed by dividing the nominal consumer expenditure for Petroleum over
nominal GDP (Table 3.5 from the Annual Energy Review 2006).
8The persistence of the oil price shock is relevant for the pattern of the response of the economy after an
oil price shock. However, it is worth noting that the e¤ects of the oil price shocks are really persistent even
for lower values of the oil . This follows because of the assumption of sector-specic capital.
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total factor productivities (TFP) across sectors, which in turn induce an increase of the
economic weight of the slowest-growing sector
2.4.1 The case of the structural change induced by the utility-basedmech-
anism
The utility-basedmechanism grounds on the idea that the utility function has an higher
income elasticity for non-traded goods rather than for traded goods. Therefore, the structural
change derives ultimately from the shift of householdspreferences towards non-traded goods
as the income increases.
The utility function that I use in the model does not allow for di¤erent income elasticities
across traded and non-traded goods, so I reproduce the shift of households preference towards
non-traded goods by changing the composition of the consumption good (wC ; wC). This
modication causes increases the relative quantity of non-traded goods produced in the
economy, but it does not a¤ect the relative price of traded goods in terms of non-traded
goods. However, the change in householdspreferences also changes the steady state values
of other variables.9 Thus, to fully evaluate the relevance of the structural change itself I
have to consider how the changes in the steady state values of the other variables a¤ect the
response of the economy to oil price shocks.
I rst dene the structural changechannel as the channel through which the increase
of the GDP share of the non-traded goods sector directly a¤ects the response of GDP to
oil price shocks. The structural change weakens the e¤ects of oil shocks on the economy
through the reduction of the size of international spillovers, which instead tend to amplify
the e¤ects of global shocks across countries.10
The intratemporal condition channel points out how the change in the steady state
values of labor and consumption a¤ects the oil-macroeconomy relationship. Indeed, as the
9The quantity of labor increases for Home and decreases for Foreign; the steady state value of the real
exchange rate increases; the Home production of traded goods and the Foreign production of non-traded
goods all increase; GDP and consumption in both countries decrease.To understand why the change in the
composition of the consumption good produces these e¤ects, we have to consider that the amount of oil
which is required to produce a given quantity of home consumption good is independent on the composition
of consumption itself between traded and non-traded goods (technology is identical across sectors). It follows
that, ceteris paribus, the Home demand of oil imports is una¤ected by the change in householdspreferences,
and so is its value in home currency. However, the more the consumption good is intensive in the non-traded
good the lower is the demand, and the production, of both Home and Foreign traded goods. It follows that
Home has to make up for the induced trade decit by making its exports cheaper. Therefore, in the new
steady state the real exchange rate has to depreciate (it is implicitly assumed that it holds an elasticity
condition for which the value of Home exports increases relatively to the value of Home imports as the rela
exchange rate depreciates).
10This e¤ect is highlighted by the lower steady state value of the ratio of imports over GDP, this last being
a measure of openness.
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steady state values of labor and consumption vary, also the incentive for households to lower
the wage to bu¤er the recessive e¤ects of oil shocks changes. In particular, for the specic
utility function that is adopted in the model, this incentive is modied solely by changes in
the steady state values of labor. Because to higher steady state levels of laborl correspond
a stronger incentive to reduce nominal wage after an oil shock, it follows that through the
intratemporal condition channel the structural change will make the e¤ects of oil price
shocks stronger for Home and weaker for Foreign.
Finally, the change in the steady state value of the real exchange rate a¤ects the GDP
response to oil shocks through two channels: the real exchange rate channel and the
consumption-investment ratio channel. The rst channel weakens the e¤ect of oil price
shocks on Foreign economic activity as the steady state value of the real exchange rate de-
preciates. This happens because the real the real price of oil, which is denominated in Home
real terms, becomes cheaper for Foreign as the exchange rate depreciates.
The consumption-investment ratiochannel, instead, highlights how an the depreciation
of the real exchange rate strengthens the e¤ect of oil shocks on Home economy and weakens
that on Foreign economy. This happens because the real exchange rate depreciation induces
a change in the relative sectorial productions across countries. In particular, the ratio of
investment to consumption increases for Home and decreases for Foreign.11 As the investment
is more volatile than consumption, the consumption-investment ratiochannel increases the
sensitivity of Home economy to oil price shocks and decreases that of Foreign.
To sum up, when I change the composition of the consumption good there are more
channels at work which contribute to modify the response of GDP to oil price shocks. Table
2.2 reports how the change in Householdspreference a¤ect these channels (either strengthens
or weakens them) and the e¤ect of every channel on the GDP response to a positive oil price
shock (increases or reduce it).
11The fact that Home traded goods become relatively cheaper increases their relative production with
respect to Foreign traded goods. On the other hand, Foreign exploits its terms of trade gain by increasing
its relative production of the non-traded goods. Thus, also the distribution of capital across sectors in both
countries changes. A higher value of the real exchange rate goes with a relatively increase of the Home capital
stock in the traded good sector, and with a relatively increase of the Foreign capital stock in the non-traded
good sector.
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Home Foreign
The intratemporal condition channel Reduces the GDP response Reduces the GDP response
The real exchange rate channel - Reduces the GDP response
The structural change channel Reduces the GDP response Reduces the GDP response
The consumption-investment ratio channel Increases the GDP response Reduces the GDP response
Home Foreign
The intratemporal condition channel Stronger Weaker
The real exchange rate channel - Stronger
The structural change channel Stronger Stronger
The consumption-investment ratio channel Stronger Stronger
on the strenght of the channels
How the GDP response to oil price shocks is affected by the channels
Table
The effect of the change in Households' preferences
Table 2.2 - How the GDP response to oil price shocks is a¤ected by the di¤erent channels
and how the strength of the channels is a¤ected by the structural change
Share of the non-traded good sector
Openness Ratio
Period GDP response (1) GDP response (2) GDP response (1) GDP response (2)
1 97,6% 97,48% 94,40% 93,4%
2 98,8% 98,33% 95,76% 93,6%
3 98,8% 98,33% 95,70% 93,7%
4 98,8% 98,34% 95,70% 94,0%
5 98,8% 98,34% 95,71% 94,3%
6 98,7% 98,35% 95,72% 94,6%
7 98,7% 98,35% 95,74% 94,9%
8 98,7% 98,35% 95,75% 95,3%
(1) Amount of hours worked unconstrained
(2) Amount of hours worked fixed
32% -> 26% 29% -> 23%
Table
Home Foreign
41% -> 55% 44% -> 56%
Table 2.3 - The e¤ect of the change in householdspreferences on the GDP response to oil
price shocks
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Table 2.3 presents results from the experiment. In particular, the composition of the
consumption good is changed so that the Home share of the non-traded good sector passes
from the steady state value of 41% (average US value in the early 1970s) to that of 55%
(average US value in the early 2000s).
The table shows the rst 8 periods of the GDP response to oil price shocks after the
structural change in percent points of the GDP response obtained before it. Thus, a value
of 98% means that after the change in householdspreferences the e¤ect of a positive oil
shock on GDP is 2% weaker than before the change. In particular, the GDP response that
is reported in the rst column is the one resulting from the interactions of all the channels
(unconstrained case), while the one reported in the second column is the one obtained by
xing the amount of hours worked (constrained case). I decide to x the amount of hours
worked in the two economies to follow the empirical evidence that the amount of labor
employed in the economy is stable over time. Moreover, the unconstrained experiment
also cancels the intratemporal conditionchannel and reduces the inuence of the others,
therefore allows me to focuse more strictly on the e¤ects of the structural changechannel.
In general the change in householdspreferences weakens the e¤ect of oil price shocks in
both countries, but the size of the reduction is small in size. In particular, the reduction is
the largest on impact, which corresponds to the through of the response of GDP, and it is
slightly higher for Foreign. However, the change in householdspreferences is able to explain
only a small reduction of the e¤ects of oil price shocks on GDP.
2.4.1.1 The role of the numeraire
In the previous experiment I do not take into account the fact that by varying the
composition of the consumption good I also change the numeraire of the economy. To check
whether this might distort the previous result, I repeat the experiment with the investment
good as the numeraire, as its composition does not change in the experiment.
Table 2.4 shows the results. By changing the numeraire the weakening of the oil-
macroeconomy relationship appears to be more evident, especially on impact when the
recessive e¤ects of oil shocks are the largest. Moreover, the reduction of the e¤ects of oil
shocks on GDP is stronger for Foreign than for Home. 12 In particular, on impact the e¤ect
of the oil shock on Home GDP gets reduced by 12-15% and that on Foreign GDP by 20-23%,
with the following periods showing a reduction in the range of 5-7% for Foreign and almost
12These two results are closely related to the consumption investment ratio channel which becomes
stronger with the investment good as a numeraire. In fact, with the investment good as the numeraire it
follows that the change in the relative price between consumption and investment applies to the consumption,
which represent 80% of total GDP in the steady state.
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no change (constrained case) or even an increase for Home (unconstrained case).
Share of the non-traded good sector
Openness Ratio
Period GDP response (1) GDP response (2) GDP response (1) GDP response (2)
1 88,12% 85,35% 76,2% 79,8%
2 103,05% 99,92% 93,4% 95,4%
3 102,77% 99,75% 93,4% 95,4%
4 102,65% 99,71% 93,4% 95,5%
5 102,53% 99,66% 93,4% 95,5%
6 102,40% 99,61% 93,5% 95,6%
7 102,25% 99,55% 93,5% 95,7%
8 102,08% 99,49% 93,5% 95,8%
(1) Amount of hours worked unconstrained
(2) Amount of hours worked fixed
41% -> 55% 44% -> 56%
32% -> 26% 29% -> 23%
Table
Home Foreign
Table 2.4 - The e¤ect of the change in householdspreferences on the GDP response to oil
price shocks
2.4.2 The case of a structural change induced by the unbalanced produc-
tivity growthmechanism
Baumol (1967) rst conjectured that di¤erent growth rates of total factor productivity
(TFP) across sectors, or unbalanced productivity growth(UPG), would cause the slowest-
growing sector to increase its relative economic weight. Table 2.4 presents the rate of growth
of both labor and total factor productivity of Manufacturing, non-Manufacturing and Non-
Farm business in the US. It is evident that the growth rate of productivity of Manufacturing
has been far larger than that of the other two sectors over the period 1973-1996. Thus, as
Manufacturing represents the main component of the traded good sector, it is then plausible
to argue that US might have experienced a structural change through a UPG mechanism,
with the non-traded good sector as the slowest-growing sector.
I then check whether in the model a structural change induced by the UPG mechanism
might explain the weakening of the oil-macroeconomy relationship. However, for the UPG
mechanism to produce a structural change in this model I need to consider two factors: I
have to nd what demand conditions the model has to satisfy and I have to check if the
increase in TFPs directly reduces the e¤ect of oil shocks on economic activity through the
reduction in oil intensity.
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Output per Hour Non-Farm Business Manufacturing Estimated non Manufacturing
1949-73 2,8 2,6 3
1973-96 1,5 2,7 1
Multifactor productivity Non-Farm Business Manufacturing Estimated non Manufacturing
1949-73 1,9 1,5 2,1
1973-96 0,2 0,8 0
Description: U.S. Labor and Multifactor productivity, Average Annual Rates of Change, 1949-96
Table
Source: Triplett and Bosworth (2001)
Table 2.4 - U.S. Labor and Multifactor productivity, Average Annual Rates of Change,
1949-96
To do this, I extend the two-country model by Corsetti and Pesenti (2005) in two ways:
I comnsider two sectors, the traded and the non-traded good sector, and introduce oil as an
additional input factor other than labor. The model remains simple enough to allow me to
obtain a closed form solution, so that I can derive analytically both the demand conditions
for the UPG to increase the share of non-traded goods, and the direct e¤ect of increasing
TFPs on the oil price elasticity of GDP. The model is reported in details in the appendix,
in what follows I only briey present the main results.
I nd that a su¢ cient condition for the UPG mechanism to increase the share of the non-
traded good sector (which is assumed to be the slowest-growing sector) is that the elasticity
of substitution between traded and non-traded goods in consumption is lower than unity.13
To get an intuition on the interpretation of this condition we have to consider that the
UPG produces two e¤ects. The rst e¤ect is to increase the price of the non-traded good in
terms of both the traded and the consumption good, which obviously increases the share of
GDP represented by the non-traded good sector. I dene this e¤ect as the price e¤ect. The
second e¤ect, which I dene as the quantity e¤ect, is the expenditure switching from the
non-traded to the traded good sector which is induced by the change in the relative price.
The elasticity of substitution between traded and non-traded goods then determines
which one of the two e¤ects will prevail. In particular, only if teh elasticity is below unity
the quantity e¤ect will be smaller than the price e¤ect.
Finally, I also nd that a su¢ cient condition for the domestic share of the non-traded
good to increase is that the UPG occurs abroad, that is that the growth rate of productivity
of the foreign traded good sector is higher than that of the foreign non-traded good sector.
13This result is similar to that found by Ngai and Pissarides (2004), and respect the intuition of Baumols
claim about the need for a su¢ cient inelastic demand for the UPG to increase the share of the slowest-growing
sector.
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2.4.2.1 The e¤ect of Total Factor Productivity increases on the oil-macroeconomy relation-
ship
The quantity of oil per-unit of output has been reducing over the last decades because
of the adoption of more e¢ cient technologies. However, I argue that not any technological
progress automatically implies a reduction in the oil price elasticity of GDP, that is a weaker
e¤ect of oil shocks on GDP. In particular, I consider the case of an increase of the TFP.
On the one hand, an higher TFP implies an higher marginal productivity, which reduces
the quantity of oil per unit of output; on the other hand, the higher marginal productivity
means that the reduction of one unit of oil in the production will cause a larger drop in the
quantity of output produced. It is then not clear whether and how an increase in TFP would
change the way oil shocks a¤ect output.
I use the former model to show analytically that with a Cobb Douglas production function
the oil price elasticity of GDP depends on technological parameters which are not a¤ected
by a change in the TFP. As in the baseline model I also adopt Cobb Douglas technology,
it follows that even if the UPG mechanism requires an increase in TFPs to produce the
structural shocks, I will expect the higher values of TFPs to have no direct e¤ects on the
way oil shocks a¤ect GDP.
I then check for the validity of this conjecture by performing the following experiment:
I compute the response of GDP to a positive oil price shock before and after increasing the
TFPs of any sector and country in the same proportion, and then verify whether and how
the increase in TFPs a¤ect the oil price elasticity of GDP elasticity.
I notice that as I increase the TFPs the most relevant changes are in the steady state
values of labor employed and in the relative prices of input factors.14 In the attempt to
isolate as much as possible the direct e¤ect of the increase of TFPs on the oil price elasticity
of GDP I also perform the experiment by constraining the steady state value of hours worked
not to change (constrained case). Indeed, the lower level of steady state hours worked makes
the wage-setters less willing to lower the wage after a positive oil price shock, so that I expect
the e¤ect of oil shocks on GDP to increase in the unconstrained case.
14An increase of the TFPs induce an increase in the relative use of capital and energy with respect to
labor, because the real price of energy and the rate of return on capital do not change in the new steady
state, while the real wage increases. The real price of oil does not change because it is exogenous. The
rate of return on capital does not change because it depends on the real price of investments, which is not
a¤ected by changes in the TFPs that are proportional across countries and sectors. Instead, the real wage
tends to rise because of both the increase in the marginal productivity of labor and the fact that leisure and
consumption are normal goods, so that households nd optimal in the new steady state to work less and
consume more with a higher real wage.
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Figure 2.2 - The Home and Foreign GDP response to positive oil price shock when the
Total Factor Productivity increases.
Figure 2.2 shows the response of both Home (top panel) and Foreign GDP (bottom panel)
to a positive oil price shock in the unconstrained and constrained case. In both countries, the
increase of TFPs in the unconstrained case augments the e¤ect of oil price shocks on GDPs
at any period, as it was expected. Instead, in the constrained case there is almost no change
in the response of Home GDP to positive oil price shocks as TFPs increase. The Foreign
GDP response, instead, varies even in the constrained case because the real exchange rate
channel is at work.
I conclude that this experiment is in favor of the result of neutrality of oil price elasticity
of GDP with respect to changes in TFPs even for the baseline model.
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2.4.2.2 The e¤ect of unbalanced productivity growth (UPG) on the oil-macroeconomy re-
lationship
In the following experiment I verify whether a structural shock induced by the UPG
mechanism may cause a weaker response of the economic activity to oil price shocks. I
reproduce the structural shock induced by the UPG mechanism by increasing the TFPs of
the traded good sectors in both countries (ZH ; ZF ) until theGome GDP share of the non-
traded good sector passes from 41%, the average US value over the period 1970-1975, to 55%,
the average US value over the period 2000-2005. It follows that I dene as the 1970s-GDP
the GDP response to an oil shock obtained before changing the TFPs; similarly, I dene the
GDP response obtained after changing the TFPs as the 2000s-GDP response.
Share of the non-traded good sector
Openness Ratio
Period GDP response (1) GDP response (2) GDP response (1) GDP response (2)
1 99,81% 91,84% 97,9% 91,7%
2 109,19% 94,68% 106,9% 94,3%
3 108,72% 95,57% 106,5% 95,1%
4 108,16% 96,58% 105,9% 96,1%
5 107,51% 97,72% 105,3% 97,2%
6 106,76% 99,00% 104,6% 98,4%
7 105,90% 100,41% 103,7% 99,7%
8 104,93% 101,96% 102,8% 101,1%
(1) Amount of hours worked unconstrained
(2) Amount of hours worked fixed
41% -> 55% 44% -> 56%
32% -> 26% 29% -> 23%
Table
Home Foreign
Table 2.5 - The e¤ect of unbalance productivity growth on the GDP response to oil price
shocks
Table 2.5 reports, for each country, the 2000s-GDP response in percent points of the
1970s-GDP response: that is, a value of 96% means that in the early 2000s the GDP response
is 4 percent point weaker than in the early 1970s.
For each country, the rst column of the table shows that, apart from the rst period,
the e¤ect of oil shocks on GDP grows larger. This is mainly a consequence of the changes in
the steady state values of the number of hours worked that is induced by increasing TFPs,
and which tend to amplify the e¤ects of oil shocks. 15
15Other changes are in the real exchange rate and in the consumption-investment ratio.
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I then compute the 2000s-GDP response by constraining the steady state values of num-
ber of hours worked to remain unchanged over the experiment. The second column reports
the results for the constrained experiment, which conrms that once that the intratemporal
condition channel is controlled for, the 2000s-GDP response becomes weaker than the 1970s
GDP not only on impact but also in the following periods.
I then conclude that as the GDP share of the non traded good sector increases the
e¤ects of the oil price shocks on Home and Foreign GDP get weaker. I argue that what
determines the weakening of the e¤ects of the oil price shocks on economic activity is the
reduced sensitivity of national economies to global shocks which is induced by the structural
change. In other words, the greater the share of the non traded good sector, the smaller the
size of international spillovers, which tend to amplify global shocks. This e¤ect is highlighted
by the observed decrease in the openness ratio after the increase in the TFPs.
2.5 Conclusions
I argue that the change in the composition of GDP that has been experienced by the
US over the last decades provides an additional explanation for the weakening of the oil-
macroeconomy relationship.
To analyse the relative importance of this channel I set up a two country two sector
model with oil as additional input factor. I then use the model to analyse whether and
to what extent the increase in the GDP share of the non traded goods sector weakens the
e¤ects of oil shocks on GDP. This experiment is performed by taking into account the two
principal mechanisms that the literature on structural change puts forwards: the change in
households preferences and the unbalanced productivity growth.
In performing the experiment I have to control for di¤erent channels, other than the
change in GDP composition, which may a¤ect the oil macroeconomy relationship. Once I
control for these other channels, the experiment shows that the increase of the GDP share
of the non-traded goods sector has a marginal role in explaining the weakening of the oil-
macroeconomy relationship. I argue that this e¤ect is mainly cause by the lowering size of
international spillovers induced by the structural shocks.
I contribute to the debate on the role of technological progress in a¤ecting the oil-
macroeconomy relationship by showing that with Cobb Douglas technology the oil price
elasticity of GDP is neutral to change in TFPs. Finally, I show that in an open economy
framework for a country to experience a structural change induced by an unbalanced pro-
ductivity growth mechanism it is su¢ cient that a Foreign country experiences the di¤erences
in the sectorial growth rates of TFPs.
Appendices
2.A: Notation of the model
Endogenous Variables
Ct(j) = Home Consumption at time t by household j
Ct (j) = Foreign Consumption at time t by household j
Lt(j) =Home labor supplied at time t by household j
Lt (j) = Foreign labor supplied at time t by household j
LH;t(j) =Home labor in the traded goods sector at time t by household j
LN;t(j) =Home labor in the non-traded goods sector at time t by household j
LF;t(j) =Foreign labor in the traded goods sector at time t by household j
LN;t(j) =Foreign labor in the non-traded goods sector at time t by household j
"t =Nominal exchange rate at time t (Home currency per unit of FOreign currency)
Bt(j) = Value of the Home currency Bond held at time t by household j
Bt (j) =Value of the Foreign currency International Bond held at time t by household j
it+i =Home nominal interest rate (set at the end of period t an dpaid at the beginning
of period t+1)
it+i =Foreign nominal interest rate (set at the end of period t an dpaid at the beginning
of period t+1)
Wt(j) =Nominal wage rate at time t set by Household j
t =Financial transaction cost at time t
Pt = Home price of one unit of consumption good at time t
P It =Home price of one unit of investment good at time t
P t =Foreign price of one unit of consumption good at time t
P I

t =Foreign price of one unit of investment good at time t
It(j) = Home investment at time t by Household j
It (j) =Foreign investment at time t by Household j
RN;t = Home nominal rate of Return on capital in the non-traded goods sector at time t
RH;t = Home nominal rate of Return on capital in the traded goods sector at time t
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RN;t = Foreign nominal rate of Return on capital in the non-traded goods sector at time
t
RF;t = Foreign nominal rate of Return on capital in the traded goods sector at time t
KN;t(j) = Home capital in the non-traded goods sector at time by Household j
KH;t(j) =Home apital in the traded goods sector at time by Household j
KN;t(j) =Foreign capital in the non-traded goods sector at time by Household j
KF;t(j) =Foreign capital in the traded goods sector at time by Household j
ft (j) =Share of prot from the intermediate sector at time t by Household j
bt(j) =Share of prot from the nancial sector at time t by Household j
Tt = Home Intermediate traded good used to produce C at time t
Nt = Home intermediate non-traded good used to produce C at time t
T t = Foreign Intermediate traded good used to produce C
 at time t
Nt = Foreign intermediate non-traded good used to produce C
 at time t
HC;t = Home traded intermediate goods used in Home consumption production
HI;t = Home traded intermediate goods used in Home investment production
FC;t = Foreign traded intermediate goods used in Home consumption production
FI;t = Foreign traded intermediate goods used in Home investment production
HC;t = Home traded intermediate goods used in Foreign consumption production
HI;t = Home traded intermediate goods used in Foreign investment production
F C;t = Foreign traded intermediate goods used in Foreign consumption production
F I;t = Foreign traded intermediate goods used in Foreign investment production
t = Home ination rate at period t
t = Foreign ination rate at period t
Exogenous variable
ZH = Total factor productivity in the Home traded goods sector
ZF = Total factor productivity in the Foreign traded goods sector
ZN = Total factor productivity in the Home non-traded goods sector
ZN = Total factor productivity in the Foreign non-traded goods sector
Pe = Home real consumption denominated price of oil
Parameters
 = Subjective discount factor
 = Inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
 = Parameter of the Home disutility of labor e¤ort
 = Parameter of the Home disutility of labor e¤ort
 = Capital depreciation rate
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(1  ) = Share of labor in any intermediate good production (technology are identical
across countries and sectors)
 = elasticity of substiitution between capital and oil
1; 
2
 = Transaction cost parameters for Home households purchasing Foreign-denominated
bonds
!C = Share of Tt in Ct
!C = Share of T

t in C

t
!H = Share of Ht in Tt
!H = Share of F

t in T

t
!I = Share of Ht in It
!I = Share of F

t in I

t
C = Home elasticity of input substitution in C
C = Foreign elasticity of input substitution in C

T = Home elasticity of input substitution in T
T = Foreign elasticity of input substitution in T

N = Home elasticity of input substitution in N
N = Foreign elasticity of input substitution in N

I = Home elasticity of input substitution in I
I = Foreign elasticity of input substitution in I

H = Elasticity of substitution among Home traded di¤erentiated intermediate goods
N = Elasticity of substitution among Home non-traded di¤erentiated intermediate
goods
F = Elasticity of substitution among Foreign traded di¤erentiated intermediate goods
N = Elasticity of substitution among Foreign non-traded di¤erentiated intermediate
goods
 = Persistence of the Home nominal interest rate
 = Persistence of the Foreign nominal interest rate
 = Weight of the ination gap in Home Monetary policy
Y = Weight of the output gap in Home Monetary policy
 = Weight of the ination gap in Foreign Monetary policy
Y = Weight of the output gap in Foreign Monetary policy
 = Home ination rate target
 = Foreign ination rate target
B.2: The closed form Model
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Figure B.2.1 - Structure of the model
The world economy consists of two identical countries denominated Home and Foreign.
In each country the economic agents are households and rms. Variables with an asterisk
denote prices and quantities in the Foreign country.
Households
Households consume a non-traded consumption good, supply labor in a perfectly com-
petitive labor market and trade in Arrow Debreu contingent assets (full consumption risk-
sharing). In each country the population size is normalized to one so that per capita and
aggregate variables coincide. Households within the same country share the same preferences
and budget constraint, so that for each country there is a representative agent.
The structure of the supply side.
The supply side of the economy is split into a perfectly competitive nal good sector and
an imperfectly competitive intermediate good sector. In each country the intermediate good
sector is composed of a traded good and a non-traded good sector.
Firms in the intermediate good sector produce di¤erentiated varieties of traded and
non-traded goods through a Cobb Douglas technology which uses labor and energy as in-
puts. Firms have a monopoly power over the supply of their product and in absence of
nominal rigidities set prices as a markup over marginal costs. The varieties of each sector
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are then aggregated into intermediate good aggregators: the Home-produced traded goods
aggregators(H=H), the Foreign-produced traded goods aggregators (F =F ), and the coun-
try specic non-traded goods aggregators(N=N), which are then used in the nal good
sector to produces the consumption good (C=C).
Utility function
U

Ct(j); Lt(j);
Mt(j)
Pt

= lnCt(j)  Lt(j) + Mt(j)
Pt
C =
h
(C)
1
 H
1  1

t + ((1  ) C)
1
 F
1  1

t + (1  C)
1
 N
1  1

t
i  1
;
C(j) = Consumption good consumed by Households (j)
L(j) = Number of hours worked by Households (j)
Mt(j)
Pt
= Real Balances holdings by Households (j)
Ht = Aggregator of Home  produced varieties of traded goods
Ft = Aggregator of Foreign  produced varieties of traded goods
Nt = Aggregator of Home  produced varieties of non  traded goods
Pt= Price of one unit of the consumption good
Parameters in the utility function:
 > 0;disutility of labor,
 > 0;utility.of real balances,
C 2 (0; 1) weight of the domestic traded good in C,
 2 (0; 1) proportion between Home traded and non-traded good in C,
 > 0 elasticity of input substitution in C;
 2 (0; 1) ; discount rate.
Budget constraint
PtCt(j) +Mt(j) +
X
st
Q(st+1; st)Bt(j; st) + "t
X
st
Q(st+1; st)Bt (j; st)
 Mt 1(j) +WtLt(j) + t(j) +Bt 1(st;j) + "tBt (st;j)
"t=Nominal exchange rate.
Q(st+1; st)=Q
(st+1; st) = the price of a Home/Foreign Arrow-Debreu security.
Bt(j; st)=B

t (j; st) = Quantity of a Home/Foreign Arrow-Debreu security.
Wt = Nominal wage
t(j) = Share of prots from the intermediate sector held by Household (j).
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Aggregators
Ht =
24 1Z
0
Ht(h)
1  1
 H dh
35
 H
 H 1
; Ft =
24 1Z
0
Ft(f)
1  1
 F df
35
 F
 F 1
; Nt =
24 1Z
0
Nt(n)
1  1
 N dn
35
 N
 N 1
:
Ht(h) =Di¤erentiated variety h in the industry H
Ft(f) =Di¤erentiated variety f in the industry F
Nt(n) =Di¤erentiated variety n in the industry N
Parameters
 H > 1 elasticity of substitution among varieties in the industry H,
 F > 1 elasticity of substitution among varieties in the industry F ,
 N > 1 elasticity of substitution among varieties in the industry N
Intermediate sector
Yt(h) = ZHL

t (h) E
(1 )
N (h)
Yt(h) = Ht(h) +H

t (h)
N(n) = ZNL

t (n) E
(1 )
N (n)
Yt(h) = N(n)= output of the rm producing the variety h = n
Ht(h) +H

t (h) =Demand of the variety Yt(h)
Lt(h) = labor input employed by rm Y (h)
EN;t(h)= energy employed by rm Y (h)
ZH = ZN= Total Factor Productivity common to all the industries in the traded good
sector = non traded good sector
 2 (0; 1) is the share of labor in the production function(common to all rms).
Monetary Policy
The stance of monetary policy is given by t = PtCt;it reects the e¤ect of monetary
policy on the aggregate nominal spending, independently on the specic instrument that it
adoptes.
The real price of oil
I assume that the real price of oil in Home unit of consumption is exogenous, so that
pe;t =
Pe;t
Pt
is exogenous. I also assume that the law of one price holds Pe;t = "tP e;t: It is then
possible to link the the real price of oil in terms of Foreign unit of consumnption to pe;t as
follows:
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pe;t =
1
t
pe;t
pe;t =
Ct
Ct
pe;t
2.C: Symmetric equilibrium
I consider a symmetric equilibrium where  = (1 ); C = C ;  = ;  = ; and  is
common across countries and sectors.
Consumption and Labor in equilibrium
Ct = p
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Flexible price Equations
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2.D: The e¤ect of unbalanced productivity growth on
GDP composition
It is easy to dene the GDP share of the non-traded goods sector in equilibirum
PNN
PC
= (1  C)(1 )(1 )
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+ (1  ) 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()
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+(1  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375
 1
Proposition 2.1 If the total factor productivity of either the Home traded good sector (ZH)
or the Foreign traded good sector (ZF ) increases relatively to the total factor productivity of
the domestic non-traded goods sector (ZN); then, a su¢ cient condition for the Home GDP
share of the non traded good sector to increase is that the elasticity of substitution between
traded and non-traded goods in C is below unity ( < 1):
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Proof. By taking the rst di¤erence of PNN
PC
with respect to either ZH
ZN
or ZF
ZN
I obtain
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which implies that
@

PNN
PC

@

ZH
ZN
 > 0 if  < 1:
2.E: The oil-price elasticity of real GDP
The oil-price elasticity of output
 
C;Pe

tells us in what direction and by how many
percent points the real GDP (C) changes when the real price of oil increases by 1 percent.
I can then use this measure to analyse how an increase in TFP a¤ects the response of GDP
to oil price shocks.
Proposition 2.2 With Cobb-Douglas production functions the oil price elasticity of GDP is
una¤ected by changes in total factor productivities.
Proof. By computing C;Pe I nd that with a Cobb Douglas technology it is constant ,
as it depends only on .
C;Pe =

dC
dpe


C
pe
 = (  1)

< 0
It follows that any increase in the TFP does not change the output elasticity of the price of
oil, that is, the change in the TFP does not a¤ect the sensitivity of the economy to the real
price of oil.
d
 
C;Pe

dZ
= 0
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CHAPTER 3
EXPLAINING THE LARGEIMPACT OF OIL PRICE
SHOCKS ON GDP
3.1 Introduction
The way oil price shocks a¤ect the economy, namely GDP, has been widely investigated
by the literature since the oil crisis of the early 1970s, when the empirical estimates of the
e¤ects of oil shocks on GDP appeared to be larger that the oil share. Indeed, before that
episode the traditional argument that was used to explain the e¤ects of oil shocks on GDP
was the factor share argument, according to which the oil price elasticity of GDP should be
equal to the oil share.
This paper analyses the impact of oil price shocks on GDP in an open economy framework
and develops a mechanism which is able to amplify them beyond the oil share. For these
purposes, I set up two theoretical models. I rst set up a basic two-country model whose
analytical tractability allows me to obtain the following results on the oil-macroeconomy
relationship. First, I show that the introduction of nominal rigidities considerably modies
the way oil shocks a¤ect the economy with respect to the exible price regime. In the exible
price regime the e¤ect of oil shocks on economic activity is symmetric across countries and
the oil price elasticity of both GDP and price level is constant. Instead, with the introduction
of nominal rigidities oil shocks turn to have asymmetric e¤ects across countries and the oil
price elasticity of both GDP and price becomes an increasing function of the size of oil
shocks. Second, I show analytically that a small open economy model, in comparison to a
general equilibrium model, underestimates the e¤ect of oil price shocks on GDP. Third, I
show that the use of either the nominal or the real price of oil has di¤erent implications as to
the impact of oil shocks on the economy, even though both measures lead to similar results
as long as the oil share is small.
The basic model has a limited explaining power for the largee¤ect of oil shocks on
GDP, where by largeI mean an oil price elasticity of GDP greater than the oil share. I
then show that in an extended two-country, two-sector model with sector specic capital,
oil price shocks can cause a largee¤ect on GDP even with exible prices. Di¤erently from
former multi-sector models that have been developed to analyse the oil-macroeconomy
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relationship, I do not assume di¤erent technologies across sector, namely I assume that the
two sectors have the same oil intensity. Indeed, the model may produce largee¤ects of oil
price shocks on GDP even with an identical technology across sectors as long as consumption
and investment have a di¤erent composition in terms of sectorial intermediate goods. Finally,
the introduction of nominal wage rigidities then further amplies the e¤ects of oil price shocks
on GDP with respect to the exible price regime. In particular, oil shocks do not only cause
a larger impact on GDP but also their e¤ect on economic activity become more persistent.
Section 2 presents some evidence and a survey of the relevant literature on the e¤ects
of oil shocks on GDP. Section 3 describes the basic theoretical model and presents results.
Section 4 describes the extended model and presents results. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 The largee¤ect of oil shocks: evidence and theory
Date Event Drop in world production Drop in U.S.  GDP
Nov. 1956 Suez Crisis 10,10% -2,50%
Nov.1973 Arab-Israel War 7,80% -3,20%
Nov. 1978 Iranian Revolution 8,90% -0,60%
Oct. 1980 Iran-Iraq war 7,20% -0,50%
 Exogenous Disruption in world Petroleum Supply
Source: Hamilton (2003)
Table 3.1 - The estimated drop in US GDP after large oil shocks
Table 3.1 shows the e¤ects of oil shocks on US GDP estimated by Hamilton in correspon-
dence to exogenous events which caused a relevant drop in the world oil supply. For each
episode it is reported the date of the month in which the largest drop has been registered,
the relative drop in world petroleum supply and the estimated amount by which US GDP
declined between the date of the oil shock and the trough of the subsequent recession, which
usually is reached four quarters after the oil shock. Thus, the estimated declines of GDP
relative to trend are above 0.4%, which is the GDP drop that would be predicted by the
factor share argument for a 10% drop in the world oil supply.
In what follows I report the theoretical channels which the literature has put forward to
explain the e¤ects of oil shocks on GDP.
3.2.1 The supply-side channel
The supply-side channel, pointed out by Rasche and Tatom (1977), Barro (1984) and
Bruno and Sachs (1985), explains the recessive e¤ect of positive oil price shocks as an e¤ect
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of its scarcity, which causes a lower use of oil in the production so that both the GDP and the
productivity of the other factors decline. Accordingly, the NAIRU and the interest rate goes
up, the latter signalling the fact that consumers save less (or borrow more) for consumption
smoothing. The demand for real balances also falls for any given stance of monetary stock, as
the output decreases and both the interest rate and the ination rate rises. Finally, because
the lower labor productivity commands lower real wages, the presence of nominal or real
wage rigidities may further reduce GDP and employment.
3.2.2 The Income transferschannel
Fried and Schulze (1975), Dohner (1981) and Bruno and Sachs (1985) note that the
rise in the price of oil implies a resource shift from net oil-importing countries to net oil-
exporting countries. As long as the extra income of oil-exporting countries is not spent
into goods produced in oil-importing countries, the world aggregate demand will fall and the
world supply of savings will increase. The increase in the world supply of savings might o¤set
the recessive e¤ect of oil shocks by mean of a lower world interest rate, which might push
investments up to make up for the fall in consumption in the net oil-importing countries.
The e¤ective relevance of this channel then depends on two factors: the development of
international nancial markets and the presence of nominal rigidities. However, even though
theoretically relevant, this channel imply consequences that are conterfactual. Indeed, it
cannot explain the fact that most recessions that have followed oil price shocks have been
worldwide in nature (Ferderer 1999) and why countries that are more dependent on oil-
imports did not necessarily su¤er more during the crises. 1
3.2.3 Oil shocks and monetary policy
The role of monetary policy in the propagation of oil shocks is somewhat debated in
the literature. It has been recently reemphasized by Bohi (1991) and Bernanke, Gertler
and Watson (1997), who argue that the tight response of monetary policy to the rise in the
price of oil is the main responsible for the recession. However, this emphasis on the role of
monetary policy has been challenged by Brown and Yücel (1995) and Hamilton and Herrera
(2000).
Brown (2000) also argues that the monetary policy matters to evaluate the real e¤ects
of oil price shocks, but emphasizes that it is the specic monetary policy target to determine
1For example, the United Kingdom experienced a much more severe recession during the 197881 oil
crisis than Japan did, despite the fact that the UK was a net oil exporter and Japan was an oil importer
(see Bohi, 1991).
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the trade-o¤ between ination and output which follows an oil price shock2.
3.2.4 Non standard channels: Endogenous rate of capital depreciation, Coun-
tercyclical Markups, Uncertainty and Input Reallocation costs
Some authors moved away from standard assumptions of real business cycle models
to nd other channels which could reproduce the large impact of oil shocks on GDP. In
particular, I consider four di¤erent alternative models. The rst model is by Woodford
and Rotemberg (1996). They move away from the hypothesis of perfect competition and
explain the large impact of oil shocks on GDP through countercyclical markups. Indeed, the
recessive e¤ect of positive oil price shocks gets reinforced by the increase in markups which
further reduce the aggregate demand.
The second model is by Finn (2000). She uses a neoclassical model of perfect competition
with a variable capital depreciation rate and with energy as a complementary input to the
service ow from capital. In her model, oil price shocks cause uctuations in the energy
usage which a¤ect the production not only directly through the production function, but also
indirectly through its e¤ects on the depreciation and the capital utilization rate. Thus, oil
price shocks, by inducing a lower use of energy in the production, also reduce the depreciation
rate of capital, which in turn lowers the aggregate demand because of the lower level of
investments.
The third class of models comprises multi-sector models with reallocation costs, where
sectors di¤er among them for the energy intensity of the production function (Davis 1985,
Loungani 1986). In these models, oil price shocks shift the demand towards products which
are less energy-intensive, so that also inputs must be reallocated across sectors. The presence
of input reallocation costs then amplies the recessive e¤ect of oil price shocks.
Finally, the fourth model is by Bernanke (1993), who highlights the role of uncertainty
in a model with irreversible investments. In his model a rise in the price of oil increases the
level of uncertainty in the economy and reduces the propensity to invest because the option
value of delaying any kind of investment goes up.
2In particular Brown considers three monetary policy targets: a constant growth rate of nominal GDP, a
constant growth rate of the monetary aggregate and a constant interest rate. To make an example on how
the monetary target matter in a¤ecting the e¤ects of oil shocks on economic activity, we can consider that
a positive oil price shock a¤ects negatively the real GDP growth rate and tends to increase both the real
interest rate and the velocity of circulation of money. If the monetary policy target is a constant nominal
GDP growth, then the ination rate will have to increase proportionally to the real GDP slowdown, the
nominal growth of the monetary aggregate will be reduced, and so the real interest rate will be pushed
further up. Instead, if the monetary policy target aims to keep constant the interest rate, it will be both the
growth rate of the monetary aggregate and the ination rate to increase.
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3.3 A basic two-country framework to analyse the impact of oil shocks on
macroeconomic performance
In this section I use a basic two country model to derive analytically some general results
about the e¤ect of oil price shocks on GDP in a two-country framework. The model builds
on Corsetti and Pesenti (2005), but I extend it to comprehend oil as an additional input to
labor.
3.3.1 The model
The world consists of two countries of equal size, Home and Foreign. In each country
the economy consists of households and rms. Home households and rms are both dened
over a continuum of unit mass, with indexes i 2 (0; 1) and h 2 (0; 1). Foreign households
and rms are similarly dened over a continuum of unit mass, with indexes i 2 (0; 1) and
f 2 (0; 1).
Oil is a Foreign-specic resource, which is the only source of asymmetry across countries.
In what follows I describe Home economy, but the case of Foreign is symmetric
Households Home population is normalised to one. Households have identical preferences,
own national rms, derive utility from consuming the nal good and disutility from supplying
labor services to rms in exchange for wage income. The instant utility of household i is
Ut(i) = lnCt(i)  klt(i)
where k > 0 is a parameter which rules the disutility of supplying labor and Ct(i) is a
Cobb-Douglas basket of the Home (CH;t(i))and Foreign goods (CF;t(i)) ;both with a weight
equal to 1
2
:
Ct(i) = CH;t(i)
1
2CF;t(i)
1
2 :
CH;t(i) and CF;t(i) are CES baskets of, respectively, Home and Foreign di¤erentiated
varieties:
CH;t(i) =
0@ 1Z
0
Ct(h; i)
 1
 dh
1A

 1
; CF;t(i) =
0@ 1Z
0
Ct(f; i)
 1
 df
1A

 1
;
where  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across varieties which I assume to be common
across countries.
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From expenditure minimization I obtain the price level (P ) and household i demand for
each variety h and f (Ct(h; i); Ct(f; i))
P =
1
2
P
1
2
HP
1
2
F
Ct(h; i) =
1
2

Pt(h)
PH;t
  
PH;t
Pt
 1
C
Ct(f; i) =
1
2

Pt(f)
PF;t
  
PF;t
Pt
 1
C
PHCH = PFCF =
1
2
PC:
I assume no international nancial markets and no scal policy. Households then choose
consumption (Ct(i))and labor (lt(i)) to maximise the present value of the stream of instant
utilities subject to the stream of one-period budget constraints
PtCt(i)  Wtlt(i) + t(i)
Firms Each rm uses a Cobb-Douglas technology to produce a variety of the national good
Yt(h) which is an imperfectly substitute to all other varieties under conditions of monopolistic
competition:
Yt(h) = Zl
(h)E1 N (h);
where Z is the Total Factor Productivity common to all Home rms, l(h) and EN(h)
are the amount of labor and energy employed by the rm producing variety h and  2 (0; 1)
denes the share of labor income.
The aggregate demand for variety h is obtained by aggregating over Home and Foreign
households demand, so that rm h faces the following demand schedule for its product:
Yt(h) =
1
2

Pt(h)
PH;t
  
PH;t
Pt
 1
C +
1
2
 
P t (h)
P H;t
!  
P H;t
P t
 1
C:
Any Home rm then set the prices for its product to mazimise prots t(h):
t(h) = (Pt(h) MCt(h))
1Z
0
Ct(i; h)di+ ("tP

t (h) MCt(h))
1Z
0
Ct (i
; h)di
MC(h) = MC =
(k) P 1 e;t
Z(1  )1 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Where MC(h) is the marginal cost of producing the marginal unit Y (h) which results
equal across h.
Monetary Policy The stance of monetary policy is given by t = PtCt; and reects the
e¤ect of monetary policy on the aggregate nominal spending independently on the specic
instrument that it adoptes.
The price of oil The nominal price of oil is denominated in Home currency and is exogenous.
In alternative I could also consider as exogenous the real price of oil denominated in Home
unit of consumption good.
The assume that the law of one price holds for the price of oil so that:
P e;t =
Pe;t
"t
:
3.3.2 The exible price case
In this section I focus on how the introduction of oil a¤ects the equilibrium values of the
model in both countries(nominal exchange rate, consumption and labor) as well as on the
e¤ect of oil price shocks on the two economies.
In the exible price case the equilibrium nominal exchange rate is a function of the ratio
between Home and Foreign monetary policy stance

t
t

; as in Corsetti and Pesenti, but also
of a constant ' > 1 which depends on both the Home degree of monopolistic power
 

 1

and the Home share of oil income (1  ) :
"t =
t
t
 
1 + 
 1
1 
2
1  
 1
1 
2
!
=
t
t
' ;  2 (0; 1) ;  > 1; ' > 1 (3.1)
The interpretation of the constant is related to the fact that oil is a Foreign specic
resource. Thus, the more oil is required in the production (1  )the higher the value of
Home imports, as the price of oil is exogenous in Home currency, and so the more the nominal
exchange rate has to depreciate for Home to reach the trade balance. Indeed, as (1  ) tends
to 0 ' goes to 1, and the equilibrium nominal exchange rate becomes completely determined
by the ratio between Home and Foreign monetary policies, like in Corsetti and Pesenti.
As the nominal exchange rate is una¤ected by oil price shocks and the technology is
identical across countries, in the exible price regime oil price shocks produce constant and
symmetric e¤ects across countries. However, the fact that oil is a foreign specic resource
induces a wedge in the equilibrium GDP

Ct
Ct

and labor ratio

lt
lt

. Indeed, in equilibrium
Foreign households work less and consume more than Home households
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Ct
Ct
= ' =) Ct > Ct ;
lt
lt
=
 
1  
 1
1 
2
 
1 + 
 1
1 
2
 =) lt < lt
To measure the impact of oil on the economy I compute the nominal and the real oil price
elasticities of GDP and price for both countries. The nominal oil price elasticity of GDP
el_C
el_Pe
; el_C
el_Pe

results to be equal to the oil share (1  ) in both countries; and lower than
the real oil price elasticity

el_C
el_pe
; el_C
el_pe

, which is instead equal to (1 )

in both countries:
el_C
el_pe
=
el_C
el_pe
=
(1  )

>
el_C
el_Pe
=
el_C
el_Pe
= (1  ) ;  2 (0; 1) :
This result highlights that when comparing the results on the e¤ect of oil prices on GDP
from di¤erent analysis, it should be taken into account whether the oil price which used in
the analysis is nominal or real price of oil. However, in practice such a distinction is not
crucial as long as the oil share is small, as in this case both measures would lead ti similar
results.
I also compute the elasticity of the price level in the two countries
elP
elPe
=
elP 
elPe
= (1  )
To explain the e¤ect of oil price shocks on Home and Foreign economy I can use with
a graphical interpretation through the schedule of Aggregate Supply (AS) and Aggregate
Demand (AD) on the space (C;L); like in Corsetti and Pesenti (gure 1) :
AS : C = ~L :
~ =
1
2

1
1 + '

k


1
"
 1
2

1
MC

AD : C =

P
The rst element of the AS is the term ~ , which considers both the terms of trade
and the marginal condition for the intratemporal substitution between labor and energy. A
positive oil price shock rotates the AS schedule from AS0 to AS1, but only because of the
intratemporal marginal condition between labor and energy. Indeed, as the technology is
symmetric and the nominal exchange rate is not a¤ected by oil shocks, the terms of trade
is una¤ected by oil price shocks. The oil price shock also shifts downwards the AD schedule
from AD0 to AD1 to as P increases. Thus, in the new equilibrium Home labor does not
change, consumption decreases from C0 to C1 and the price level increases from P 0 to P 1.
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AD0: C= 0P
m
AS0: C=τ l
C
l
AS1: C= τ l
AD1: C= 1P
m
C0
C1
Figure 3.1 - The e¤ect of oil price shocks on Home economy with exible prices
The mechanism works symmetrically for the Foreign Country.
3.3.3 Nominal rigidities
The introduction of nominal rigidities changes the way oil shocks a¤ect the economy.
In particular, I show that with nominal rigidities oil shocks have asymmetric e¤ects across
countries, and may produce large impact on the economy. For reasons of tractability I
follow Corsetti and Pesenti and assume that prices are predetermined one period ahead.3
Moreover, as nominal wages are determined by the stance of the monetary policy, nominal
rigidities in the model make sense only in reference to price setting and not to wage setting.
Price setting in a two-country model implies that rms have to set a price for the domestic
market and one for the foreign market. In general, if the price to be set in the foreign market
is P x , a rm will choose it to maximise prots with respect to Px"
 , where  2 [0; 1] is the
degree of pass through of nominal exchange rate on Px. I take into account the two extreme
cases, that is those corresponding to  = 0 and  = 1: The second case corresponds to the
so-called Producer Currency Pricing (PCP), and implies full pass through so that the law of
one price holds. The rst case, instead, corresponds to the so-called Local Currency Pricing
(LCP), and implies no pass through.
3Nominal rigidities may be introduced in many ways. For example, quadratic costs of price adjustment
à la Rotemberg would introduce a more interesting dynamic, but would not allow me to get an analytical
solution.
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3.3.3.1 Nominal rigidities and Price Currency Pricing
Equilibrium values for the nominal exchange rate, prices, consumption and labor are
reported in the appendix. Here I focus on how the oil-macroeconomy relationship is modied
by the introduction of nominal rigidities. I rst notice that the nominal exchange rate is no
longer independent on the price of oil:
" =


 
E [MC] =MC +  1

(1 )
2
E [MC] =MC    1

(1 )
2
!
;
therefore oil shocks produce asymmetric e¤ects across countries. It is useful to determine
the elasticity of the nominal exchange rate with respect to the nominal oil price:
el_"
el_Pe
=
1
4

 1E [MC] =MC
E [MC] =MC 
 1
2
(1 )
2
  1
 :
It is possible to distinguish two cases: for oil price shocks which are small enough,
that is such that E [MC] =MC >  1

(1 )
2
; the nominal exchange rate tends to depreciate,
and the depreciation is the higher the larger the shock; for largeoil price shocks, that is
such that E [MC] =MC <  1

(1 )
2
, the oil shock causes an appreciation of the nominal
exchange rate. While both cases are theoretically possible, however, for plausible values of
the degree of monopolistic power (), energy share (1  ) and size of the oil price shock,
only the rst case is interesting. I therefore focus the analysis on oil shocks such that
E [MC] =MC >  1

(1 )
2
and dene as the standard case the one in which this condition is
satised.
I then compute the oil price elasticities of GDP and price of both countries in terms of
el_"
el_Pe
:
el_C
el_Pe
=  1
2
el_"
el_Pe
;
el_C
el_Pe
=
1
2
el_"
el_Pe
el_P
el_Pe
=
1
2
el_"
el_Pe
;
el_P 
el_Pe
=  1
2
el_"
el_Pe
:
Because the oil price elasticities of the nominal exchange rate

el_"
el_Pe

is not constant,
but the higher the larger is the oil price shock, it is possible that large oil price shocks cause
a drop in GDP larger than the energy share.4 Moreover, with a real oil price shock the
4In general the el_"el_Pe > n(1 ) for oil price shock such that E [MC] =MC <  1 (1 )

1+(1+n)
1
2
2n

=
; and @@n < 0
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amplication e¤ect is even larger:
el_C
el_pe
=
el_C
el_Pe
1 + el_C
el_Pe
>
el_C
el_Pe
:
Another di¤erence with respect to the exible price case is that in equilibrium labor is
not anymore constant. Thus, oil shocks now a¤ect the value of labor, as it is shown by the
oil price elasticities of labor:
el_l
el_Pe
= (1  ) E [MC] =MC
E [MC] =MC   
 1
(1 )
2
> (1  ) if el_"
el_Pe
> 0:
Thus, in the standard case

E [MC] =MC > 
 1
(1 )
2

, Home labor will increase after
the shock.
AS : C = L~
~ =
k

()
1
2
E [MC]
3
2
E [MC]
1
2

E [MC] =MC    1

(1 )
2
 3
2

E [MC] =MC +  1

(1 )
2
 1
2
AD : C =

P
:
I can use the AD and AS scehdule to show graphically the e¤ects of a positive oil price
shock on Home and Foreign economies. In the standard case, a positive oil price shock will
rotate the Home AS schedule downwards from AS0 to AS1; and will shift downwards the
Home AD schedule AD0 to AD1; therefore, in the new equilibrium C decreases C0 to C1;l
increases l0 to l1and P increases P0 to P1(gure 2).
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AD0: C= 0P
m
AS0: C=τ l
C
l
AS1: C= τ l
AD1: C= 1P
m
C0
C1
l0 l1
Figure 3.2 - The e¤ect of oil price shocks on Home economy with nominal rigidities and
PCP
AS : C = L~ 
~  =
k




1 
   1


E [MC] =MC +  1

(1 )
2
2 

E [MC] =MC    1

(1 )
2
1 
 
E [MC] = ~MC
E [MC] =MC
!
L
AD : C =

P 
With nominal rigidities, the e¤ect of oil price shocks is not anymore symmetric across
countries. Indeed, the depreciation of the nominal exchange rate, by making Home exports
cheaper, lowers the foreign price level, so that the AD shifts upwards from AD0 to AD1. As
to the AS schedule, it might take both directions, depending on the size of the oil shocks.
If the size of the oil shocks is su¢ ciently small then the AS will rotate upwards from AS0
to AS1; otherwise it will rotate downwards from AS0 to AS2. Thus, the e¤ect of oil price
shocks on the equilibrium level of labor is ambiguous, as it falls to l1 for su¢ ciently small
in size oil shocks while it increases to l1otherwise. Instead, Foreign consumption increases
always from C0 to C

1 and the Foreign price level decreases from P

0 to P

1 (gure 3).
5
5
el_L
el_Pe
=   (1  ) 1
MC
2 (1  )  1 (1 )2   E [MC] =MC
E [MC] =MC    1 (1 )2

E [MC] =MC +  1
(1 )
2
 7 0:
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AD0: C*= *
0
*
P
m
C*
l*
AS1: C*= τ l*
AD1: C*= *
1
*
P
m
l0*
C1*
C0*
l1* l2*
AS0: C*= τ l*
AS2: C*= τ l*
Figure 3.3 - The e¤ect of oil price shocks on Foreign economy with nominal rigidities and
PCP
3.3.3.2 Nominal rigidities and Local Consumer Pricing
With LCP and nominal rigidities the price indexes (P; P ) are not a¤ected by oil shocks,
and the oil price elasticity of nominal exchange rate has an upward limit in the value of the
oil share (1  ) :
" =



1 +

   1
1  
2

MC
E [MC]
+


MC
E [MC="]

el_"
el_Pe
= (1  )
24  1 1 2

MC
E[MC]
+ 


MC
E[MC="]

1 + 
 1
1 
2

MC
E[MC]
+ 


MC
E[MC="]

35 2 [0; 1  )
Thus, while oil shocks still produce asymmetric e¤ects across economies, as it can be
easily shown with a graphical interpretation of the AS and AD schedule for both countries,
it is not anymore possible for oil shocks to produce largee¤ect on th eeconomies.
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AS : Ct =
k

t
MCt

   1

20@ E [MC] 12 E [MC="]
E ["MC]
1
2

E [MC="] + 


E [MC]

1ALt
AD : Ct =
t
Pt
After an oil price shock, because of the increase in MCt the AS schedule rotates down-
wards from AS0 to AS1, while the AD stays put. In the new equilibrium the level of Home
consumption level is unchanged but the amount of labor supplied is higher (gure 4).6
AD0: C= 0P
m
AS0: C=τ l
C
l
AS1: C= τ l
C0
 l0       l1
Figure 3.4 - The e¤ect of oil price shocks on Foreign economy with nominal rigidities and
LCP
The e¤ect of oil shocks on Foreign is almost symmetric to that on Home economy. Indeed,
even Foreign AD schedule is una¤ected by oil price shocks, therefore there is no change in
the equilibrium level of consumption. However, the AS schedule rotates downward but by
less than for Home economy. In fact, while the increase in the price of oil tends to reduce
the use of oil, the change in the nominal exchange rate, being the price of oil denominated
in Home currency, reduces the size of the oil price shock for Foreign economy. Thus, in the
new equilibrium the level of consumption stays put and the amount of labor increases, but
by a less amount than for Home.
6
el_C
el_Pe
= 0 ;
el_L
el_Pe
= (1  ) :
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el_C
el_Pe
= 0 ;
el_L
el_Pe
= (1  )

1  el_"
el_Pe

< (1  ) :
3.3.4 Using a Small open economy in the analysis of oil price shocks
In this section I show that a small open economy model tends to underestimates the
impact of oil price shocks on GDP. This happens because small open economy models are
unable to fully capture international spillovers, which in turn tend to amplify the e¤ect of oil
price shocks on economic activity. Indeed, as long as imports are used as intermediate inputs
for domestic productions, the e¤ect of oil shocks on GDP will pass not only through the
supply side channel, but also through the interplay between imports and exports. In fact,
after an oil shock foreign economies, by reducing their productions, will lower their demand of
domestic imports, which thing implies a further reduction in the domestic aggregate demand.
It is straightforward to show it analytically by mean of small modications to the model
that have been developed in the previous section. In particular, I now assume that both
the foreign currency value of Foreign imports and the foreign currency price of Foreign
intermediate goods are exogenous. I consider only the exible price regime and assume that
Home and Foreign have a relative weight of the world economy equal to, respectively,  and
(1  ) ;where  2 (0; 1) : I then compare the oil price elasticity of Home GDP computed
with the small open economy model

el_GDPSOC
el_Pe

to that obtained in the general equilibrium
model

el_GDPGE
el_Pe

:
el_GDP SOC
el_Pe
=  (1  ) < (1  ) = el_GDP
GE
el_Pe
It is then evident that the use of a small open economy model, with respect to the general
equilibrium model, underestimates the e¤ect of oil prices on Home GDP the more the smaller
is the weight of Home economy in the world ().
3.4 Amplifying the e¤ect of oil price shocks on GDP with a non-basic two-
country model
The basic model that has been developed in the previous section can hardly explain how
positive oil price shocks may cause GDP to fall by more than the oil share. In fact, for this
to happen the basic model must assume nominal rigidities, a specic kind of price setting,
and extremely large oil shocks.
In this section, I show that a two-country model, with a traded and a non-traded sector
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and sector specic capital, while does not allow me to get an analytical solution nonetheless
allows me to obtain a largeresponse of GDP to oil price shocks even with exible price.
Di¤erently from former multi-sector models that have been developed to analyse the oil-
macroeconomy relationship, I do not assume a di¤erent technology across sectors. . Indeed,
to explain the large e¤ect of oil price shocks the crucial assumption is that the investment and
the consumption good have a di¤erent composition in terms of traded and non-traded goods:
consumption smoothing then causes input to reallocate across sectors, and the assumption
of sector-specic capital amplies the e¤ect of oil shock on GDP and make it persistent.
The model I use is largely based on that I have already developed in chapter II, so that I
remand to chapter II and the appendix for details about the introduction of nominal rigidities.
In this section I briey explain its main characteristics in reference to gure 5The model
consists of two countries , Home and Foreign, inhabited by innitely-lived households. The
two countries are symmetric in every respect apart from the fact the oil is a Foreign-specic
resource. Each country is represented by a competitive nal good sector and a monopolistic
competitive intermediate sector. The intermediate sector produces di¤erentiated varieties of
traded and non-traded goods through a CES production function which uses labor, capital
and oil as inputs. The nal good sector produces the consumption good by aggregating
Home and Foreign traded goods and domestic non-traded goods. Labor is mobile within the
country and immobile across countries. Capital is a sector-specic input complementary to
oil (Finn 2000) whose price (Pe) is denominated in Home currency.
Households can trade in a country specic contingent bond, so that perfect risk sharing
is assumed within each country. In addition, households share the same preferences and
have the same initial level of wealth, therefore it is possible to assume a representative agent
within each country. The characterization of the nancial market is then completed with the
introduction of an international one-period riskless bond denominated in Foreign currency.
3.4.1 Results
In what follows I present results for Home and Foreign GDP response to 1% positive
shock to the real price of oil for di¤erent scenarios. In particular, I consider the exible price
case, the small open economy case and the nominal wage rigidities case.7
7The parametrization of the model is identical to that developed in chapter II section.
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3.4.1.1 The exible price case
Figure 3.6 - IRFs to 1 % positive real oil price shock in the exible price regime
The top right panel of Figure 3.6 shows Home and Foreign GDP response to a positive
1% shock to the real price of oil. In the basic model I have developed above, as well as
in standard RBC models, without the introduction of ad-hoc mechanisms (i.e. endogenous
markups, endogenous rate of depreciation) the maximumGDP fall predicted would be 1 oil%
oil%
,
where oil% stands for the oil share in the economy. Given that in the model the oil share
amounts to 2.7% of GDP, which is the average US energy share over the period 1947-2005,
I would expect a maximum GDP fall equal to 2.78% after a 1% positive real oil price shock.
I then observe that the model, even with exible price, explains a fall in GDP which is 44%
larger than that expected in basic models.
The other panels show how the mechanism through which the assumption of sector-
specic capital amplies the e¤ect of oil shocks. The top-left panel shows how consumption
smoothing implies a di¤erent reaction to oil price shocks of consumption and investment.
As consumption and investments have a di¤erent composition in terms of traded and non-
traded goods, also the production of traded and non-traded goods (bottom-right panel), and
accordingly the amount of capital required in each sector (bottom-left panel), show di¤erent
pattern in the reaction. Thus, as capital within any country cannot move freely from the
traded to the non-traded good sector, the implied loss of e¢ ciency in production in both
3.4. AMPLIFYINGTHEEFFECTOFOIL PRICE SHOCKSONGDPWITHANON-BASIC TWO-COUNTRYMODEL97
sectors amplies the fall of GDP beyond the oil share.
3.4.1.2 The response of GDP in the small open economy model
Figure 3.7 - IRFs to 1 % positive real oil price shock in the small open economy
Figure 3.7 compares Home GDP response to 1% positive oil price shock computed with
the small open economy model to that obtained with the general equilibrium model. It is
worth noting that the response of Home GDP is exactly halved with respect to the general
equilibrium model, as it was predicted by the basic mode when the two countries have equal
size.
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3.4.1.3 The response of GDP with nominal rigidities
Figure 3.8 - IRFs to 1 % positive real oil price shock in the nominal wage rigidities regime
Figure 3.8 shows how the introduction of nominal wage rigidities dramatically amplies
the e¤ect of oil price shock on GDP. In particular, I introduce in both countries quadratic
costs of nominal wage adjustment à la Rotemberg. The response of Home and Foreign GDP
to a 1% oil price shock with nominal rigidities (top-right panel) is then compared to that
computed without nominal rigidities (top-left panel). It clearly emerges that with nominal
rigidities the size of the through of GDP is three times as large as that with exible price.
But along with the size of the response of GDP it is also the persistence of the e¤ects of the
oil shock to be far larger.
The key of this results is on the response of real wage to oil price shock . Indeed, with
exible prices wage-setters nd optimal to reduce nominal wage, and accordingly the real
wage (bottom-left panel), and so bu¤er the recessive e¤ects of positive oil price shocks. With
nominal rigidities, instead, wage-setters nd optimal to increase nominal wages in the rst
periods after the oil shock, and so also real wages (bottom-right panel), further amplifying
the recessive e¤ects of oil shocks. Finally, it is worth noticing that with nominal rigidities,
even assuming an AR(1) for the real oil price, the reaction of real wages may imply, as in
the case in gure 3.8, that the reaction of GDP be close to be hump-shaped, which is the
standard pattern that is observed in empirical analysis.
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3.5 Conclusion
In this paper I set up two theoretical models to analyse the e¤ects of oil shocks on
GDP in an open economy framework, and to show how a simple modication to standard
modes may allowsfor oil price shocks to have the largeimpact on GDP which is estimated
in empirical analysis. The rst model is a basic two-country model, which permits me to
clearly describe the oil-macroeconomyrelationship in an open economy framework.
I notice that the basic model is able to capture some of the channels through which
oil shocks a¤ect the economy, namely the supply side channel, other than capturing the
importance of international spillovers. However, the basic model is not able to explain an
impact of oil shocks on GDP larger than the oil share in regime of exible prices. I then
consider the possibility of nominal rigidities, but result are ambiguous. On one side, nominal
rigidities modify substantially the oil-macroeconomy relationship as the oil price elasticity of
GDP becomes non-linear, so that the recessive e¤ects of oil shocks become larger the larger
the size of the oil shock. On the other side, the possibility for oil shocks to produce a large
impact on the economy is conditional on a specic price setting behaviours.
In the second model I show that a two country model with a traded and a non-tradedgoods
sector and with sector specic capital is able to produce a largee¤ect of oil shock on GDP
even in a regime of exible prices. This results are based on a which hinges on the as-
sumption of sector specic capital and on the working of consumption smoothing. Indeed,
as consumption and investments have a di¤erent composition in terms of traded and non-
traded goods, after an oil shock consumption smoothing will imply an input reallocation
across sectors. Thus, as capital within any country cannot move freely across sectors, the
implied loss of e¢ ciency in production in both sectors causes a the GDP to fall beyond the
oil share. Finally, I show that with the introduction of nominal wage rigidities the e¤ect of
oil shocks is even further amplied as wage setter do not nd anymore optimal to reduce
nominal wage to bu¤er the recessive e¤ects of oil shocks.
Appendices
3.A: Equilibrium equations in the basic 2-country model
I report the equilibrium values of nominal exchange rate, consumption, labor and prices
of both countries, under three di¤erent regime: exible prices, nominal rigidities with PCP
price setting and nominal rigidities with LCP price setting.
Set of equilibrium equations common to the three regimes
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3.B:Equilibrium equations in the PCPnominal rigidi-
ties regime
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Proposition 3.1 In the standard case
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3.C: Equilibrium equations in the LCPnominal rigidi-
ties regime
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The e¤ect of oil shocks on the AS schedule
Proposition 3.2 A positive oil price shock tends to rotate downwards the Home AS schedule
Proof. To prove it is enough to show that @~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< 0 :
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Proposition 3.3 A positive oil price shock tends to rotate downwards the Foreign AS sched-
ule but by a less amount than the Home AS schedule
Proof. To prove it is enough to show that el_~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3.D: The Small Open Economy Case
In the small open economy case the Home economy has weight  and the consumption
baskets is:
C = CHC
1 
F
From cost minimization I obtain the demand for the Home basket of intermediate good
CH and for the Foreign basket of intermediate goods CF :
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By taking the value of exports in foreign currency value as given, I assume that Foreign
spends a xed amount of foreign currency in imports from Home P HH
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The price of Foreign goods in Foreign country is also given
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Proposition 3.4 A a small open economy approach induces to undervalue the e¤ect of oil
price shocks on GDP.
Proof. By using the oil elasticity of GDP to measure the size of the impact of oil shocks
I show that
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3.E: The extended model with nominal rigidities
Households
Population is normalised to 1, and a generic household j must decide the ow of Con-
sumption (Ct+i), Investment (It+i), sector-specic capital (KH;t+1+i; KN;t+1+i), nominal wage
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(Wt+i), domestic Bond (Bt+1+i) and international Bonds (Bt+1+i) to maximise the present
value of the ow of instant utilities subject to the ow of intertemporal budget constraints
and the laws of motion of sector-specic capital:
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KN;t+i+1(j) = KN;t+i(j)(1  ) + IN;t+i(j):
 2 (0; 1) is the intertemporal discount factor,  > 0 is the inverse of the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution,  > 0 and  > 0 characterize the labor disutility,  2 (0; 1) is the
depreciation rate, Pt+iis the price of a unit of consumption good Ct+i, P It+iis the price of a
unit of investment good It+i, it+i and it+i are, respectively, the nominal interest rate set by
Home and Foreign monetary policy authorities, RH;t+i and RF;t+i are the nominal rates of
return on capital in the traded and non traded good sector, Bt+i+1(j) is the value of the
stock of Home contingent bond held by household j, Bt+i+1(j) is the value of the stock of
international bond held by household j, ft+i(j) is the household share of prots from the
intermediate sector. bt+i(j) the household share of prots from the nancial transaction
sector. Financial transaction costs, t+i; are dened as follows:
t+i = 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and depend on the real value of the stock of international bond held by Home at the
beginning of the period t+ i

Bt+1
Pt+1

and on the parameters 1 > 0 and 
2
 2 [0; 1] :
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] Barro, R.J. (1984), " Macroeconomics", New York: John Wiley and Sons.
[2] Bernanke, B. (1983), " Irreversibility, uncertainty and cyclical investment", Quarterly
Journal of Economics 98, 85-10
[3] Bernanke, B.S., Gertler, M., and M. Watson (1997), "Systematic Monetary Policy and
the E¤ects of Oil Price Shocks", Brooking Papers on Economic Activity 1, 91-157.
[4] Bohi, D.R. (1991), "Energy Price Shocks and Macroeconomic performance", Resource
and Energy13 (2),145-162.
[5] Brown, S. P. A. (2000), "Oil prices and the economy", The Southwest Economy, Federal
Reserve Bank of Dallas 4.
[6] Brown, S.P.A., and M.K. Yucel (1995), "Oil Prices and U.S. Aggregate Economic Activ-
ity: a Question of Neutrality", Federeal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Economic and Financial
Review, Second Quarter, 16-23.
[7] Bruno, M.R., and J. Sachs (1985), "Economics of Worldwide Stagation", Harvard
University Press.
[8] Corsetti, G., and P. Pesenti (2005), "The Simple Geometry of Transmission and Stabi-
lization in Closed and Open Economies", NBER Working Paper.
[9] Davis, S.J. (1985), "Allocative Disturbances and Temporal Asymmetries in Labor Market
Fluctuations", unpublished Ph.D thesis
107
BIBLIOGRAPHY 108
[10] Dohner, R.S. (1981), "Energy Prices, Economic Activity and Ination: survey of is-
sues and results " in K.A. Mork (Ed.): Energy Prices, Ination and Economic Activity.
Cambridge, MA: Ballinger.
[11] Ferderer, J.P. (1996), "Oil Price Volatility and the Macroeconomy", Journal of Macro-
economics 18 (1), 1-26.
[12] Finn, M. (2000), "Perfect Competition and the e¤ects of Energy Price Increases on
Economic Activity", Journal of Money, Credit and banking 36, 265-286.
[13] Fried, E.R., and C.L. Schultze (1975), "Overview" in Fried & Schultze (Eds.): Higher
Oil Prices and the World Economy. Washington, D.C.: The Brooking Institution.
[14] Hamilton, J. (1989), "A neoclassical Model of Unemployment and Business Cycles",
The Journal of Political Economy 96 (3), 593-617.
[15] Hamilton, J., and A.M. Herrera (2000), "Oil Shocks and Aggregate Macroeconomic
Behavior: the Role of Monetary Policy", Journal of Monetary Economics 51, 781-808.
[16] Loungani, P. (1986), "Oil price Shocks and the dipsersion Hypothesis", Review of Eco-
nomics and Statistics 68, 536-539.
[17] Pesenti, P. (2003), "The IMF Global Interdependence Model: Core Equations", unpub-
lished manuscript.
[18] Rasche, R.H., and J.A. Tatom (1977), "Energy Price Shocks, Aggregate Supply and
Monetary Policy: the Theory and the International Evidence", Carnegie-Rochester Con-
ference Series on Public Policy 14, 9-93.
